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Why have Yemen’s counterinsurgency and counterterrorism polices been less effective 
against the Huthi movement compared to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)? 
This paper finds that the military’s poor counterinsurgency and counterterrorism policies, 
the international effort to combat AQAP, the Huthi’s ability to recruit and mobilize large 
numbers of followers, and the Huthi leadership’s pragmatic alliances gave the Huthis the 
advantage over AQAP and the Republic of Yemen. 
Yemen faces multiple security problems. Foremost, the country faces threats from 
various groups including the Huthi Movement, AQAP, Hirak, and tribal elements with 
the Huthis recently capturing Sanaa. The country’s oil supply will soon to run out, which 
is the main source of government revenue. The country is still in the process of transition 
required by the Gulf Cooperation Council-negotiated agreement after the Arab Spring. 
These problems are exacerbated by corruption, social, and economic problems. Finally, 
state failure remains a real possibility, with the various groups battling for control. In this 
case, Yemen could become the next Somalia. The worse scenario for the U.S. would for 
Yemen to become a safe haven for a group intent on attacking U.S. citizens and interests. 
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“Ruling Yemen is like dancing on the heads of snakes.” 
— (former) President Ali Abdullah Saleh1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Republic of Yemen’s (ROY) national integrity and legitimacy are threatened 
by the loss of control of territory to armed insurgent groups. While multiple groups vie 
for control on the ground, the Huthi movement and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) are the most challenging groups for the government and have captured swathes 
of territory. The Huthi movement, having fought the government since 2004, has been 
more successful than AQAP in gaining land from government or tribal control. AQAP’s 
control ebbs and flows, whereas the Huthis have gained ground since fighting began.2 
This recently ended with the Huthis signing a power sharing agreement with the 
government.3  
Why has Yemen’s counterinsurgency/counterterrorism (COIN/CT) polices been 
less effective against the Huthi movement compared to AQAP? The strengths and 
weakness of the Huthi movement, AQAP, and the Yemeni government must be 
examined, in addition to COIN/CT polices to answer the question. The nature of the 
Huthis and AQAP must also be considered. The Huthis are part of the domestic Yemeni 
community. Supporters believe in an “imagined community” of northern Yemenis with a 
thousand-year Zaydi and Yemeni history that practiced religious tolerance towards 
Shafi’i Sunnis in Yemen.4 AQAP on the other hand, believe in an international pan-
                                                 
1 President Saleh quoted in Victoria Clark, Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2010), back cover. 
2 Lucas Winter. “The Ansar of Yemen: The Huthis and al-Qaeda.” Small Wars Journal (May 2013). 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-ansar-of-yemen-the-huthis-and-al-qaeda. 
3 “Yemen deal signed after Shiite rebels seize government,” AFP, Updated September 22, 2014, 
https://nz.news.yahoo.com/a/-/world/25072174/yemen-deal-signed-after-shiite-rebels-seize-government/. 
4 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: 
The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010), 5, 64–6, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG962.html. 
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Islamic Caliphate, want the removal of people it considers non-Muslims (including Shia) 
from the Arabian Peninsula, and want strict shariah law.5 
This thesis will use a comparative study of insurgency and COIN using mostly 
qualitative analysis of four variables. First, the background and development of the 
Huthis and AQAP will examined using social movement theory to understand why the 
Huthis have been more successful in recruiting and mobilizing members. Second, the use 
and effectiveness of COIN and CT6 policies by the ROY government will be examined. 
The third variable examined will be the effectiveness the Huthis’ and AQAP’s 
insurgencies to include factors such as military strategies and tactics, organization and 
resources, and recruitment. Finally, this paper examines the role of outside support for 
Huthi movement, AQAP and ROY, and how that support influences those groups.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH QUESTION  
Yemen faces multiple security problems. Foremost, the country faces threats from 
various groups including the Huthi movement, AQAP, Hirak7 and tribal elements. The 
country’s oil supply will soon to run out, which is the main source of government 
revenue. The country is still in the process of transition required by the Gulf Cooperation 
Council-negotiated agreement after the Arab Spring. The Yemeni government faces other 
difficult “problems, a combination of economic and social factors exacerbated by 
perceptions of corruption.”8 Finally, state failure remains a real possibility, with the 
Huthis, AQAP, Hirak, and various tribes, clans and tribal confederations battling for 
control. In this case, with Yemen could become the next Somalia. The worse scenario for 
                                                 
5 IHS Jane’s, “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency 
Intelligence Centre, last updated February 25, 2014 
,https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemI
d=+++1320834&Pubabbrev=JWIT. 
6 The Yemeni government calls both the Huthi and AQAP groups terrorists, although both groups use 
insurgent tactics. AQAP also engages in terrorism.  
7 Hirak—also known as the Southern Movement, South Yemen Movement, or the Southern 
Secessionist Movement.  





the U.S. would be a safe haven for a group intent on attacking U.S. citizens and 
interests.9 At the time of writing, the Huthis have signed a power sharing agreement with 
the government, but it has not been implemented yet.10 
A detailed study of Yemen’s two insurgencies would fill a gap in the comparative 
COIN literature. A majority of comparative studies of insurgency and counterinsurgency 
have been written on colonial insurgencies, national liberation wars, or war-time 
occupations of countries, rather than an underdeveloped country facing an internal 
struggle. Additionally, Yemen provides a unique opportunity to do a comparative study 
of a country facing two major, yet different insurgencies at the same time. Understanding 
the strengths and weaknesses of the ROY, the Huthis, and AQAP could provide insight 
into solving the conflicts and similar insurgencies waged in underdeveloped countries. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The comparative study of Yemen’s two insurgencies required for this thesis will 
cover a range of topics, so a broad range of literature was consulted for the literature 
review. The topics include the recent history of Yemen, studies of counterinsurgency, 
studies of insurgency, studies of counterterrorism, the Huthi movement, al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula, and social movement theory.  
A history of Yemen mainly dating back to the 1980s is needed to understand the 
current conflicts between the Yemeni government and the Huthis and al Qaeda. Victoria 
Clark’s Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes provides an overview of history from 
the late Ottoman period to pre-Arab Spring Yemen. Clark contends that the country is run 
by “dancing on the heads of snakes,” or working with various tribes, clans, 
confederations, and militias by “mediating, balancing, reconciling, co-opting, rewarding 
and forgiving.”11 This patronage network is dependent on dwindling oil revenue.12 The 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) provides further details of the current governing 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 1–4.  
10 AFP, “Yemen deal signed after Shiite rebels seize government.” 
11 Clark, Dancing on the Heads, 279. 
12 Ibid., 279. 
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environment with the rugged terrain, tribal society, slow socioeconomic development and 
corruption making it difficult to control territory.13 The roots of both the AQAP and 
Huthis were found in several sources. W. Andrew Terrill of Strategic Studies Institute 
wrote two small books on Yemen. Terrill notes that AQAP, like the original “al Qaeda 
central,” (AQC) had its roots in the returning Afghani-Arabs from the Afghan War 
against the USSR.14 In the 1990s, al Qaeda in Yemen was the same organization at the 
AQC.15 Lucas Winter, writing about the Huthi movement, also known as the Shabab al-
Mumin, the Believing Youth (BY), or Ansar Allah, finds that the group originated as a 
Zaydi revivalist and Islamist16 group in the 1990s in northern Yemen.17 After increasing 
repression from the ROY the movement turned violent in 2004.18 
Knowledge of counterinsurgency (COIN) theory will help with the required 
qualitative analysis of the two ongoing COIN operations in Yemen. Daniel Marston and 
Carter Malkasian’s Counterinsurgency on Modern Warfare, a comparative study of 14 
wars, finds that the most conflicts are solved with political compromise rather than 
complete military victory. According to Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, “tactical 
brilliance at counterinsurgency translates into very little when political and social context 
is ignored or misinterpreted.”19 Brutal military tactics, and bad military leadership, are 
also cited as failures.20 On the other hand, Douglas Porch claims COIN operations are 
descended from colonial wars and violate the principles of Clausewitz. A conventional 
                                                 
13 Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2010), i, 1–2. 
14 W. Andrew Terrill, The Struggle for Yemen and the Challenge of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013) 21–24. 
15 W. Andrew Terrill, The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. 
Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 43–50; Terrill, Struggle for Yemen 21–24.  
16 Islamism—a type of activism that uses Islam; can be political or apolitical, violent or nonviolent. 
International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism,” Middle East/North Africa Report 37 (2005), i. 
17 This report uses Huthi for the militia and Believing Youth for the study group.  
18 Lucas Winter, “Yemen’s Huthi Movement in the Wake of the Arab Spring,” Counter Terrorism 
Center Sentinel 5, no. 8 (August 2012), 13–14. 
19 Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian “Introduction” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 2nd 
ed., ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey, 2008), 16–17.  
20 Ibid., 16–17.  
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war against insurgencies should be waged.21 Samuel B. Griffith II boils down the “anti-
guerilla” tactics to “location, isolation, and eradication.”22 Yemen struggles with all 
three. Max Boot’s historical comparative study of 5000 years of guerilla warfare finds 
guerillas usually lose. He also finds public opinion the most important development in 
guerilla warfare in the last 200 years, and conventional tactics do not work against 
unconventional warfare.23 Lastly, Jane Novak published a short comparative study of 
Yemen’s current conflicts including the Hirak movement, which is not violent. Novak 
concludes that the insurgencies are the result of the “criminalization of the state,” arguing 
that only democratization and rule of law will stop the Huthi, Hirak, and Arab Spring 
protestors.24 
Related to counterinsurgency is insurgency theory. Mao Tse-tung in his classic 
On Guerrilla Warfare, identifies several fundamental steps in achieving military and 
political victory: “(1) Arousing and organizing the people; (2) achieving internal 
unification politically; (3) establishing bases; (4) equipping forces; (5) recovering 
national strength; (6) destroying enemy’s national strength; [and] (7) regaining lost 
territories.”25 Both the Huthis and AQAP have made efforts in steps 1–4 and 7. Another 
classic study of insurgency strategy is Robert Taber’s War of Flea. In a comparative 
study of communist revolutions in China, Cuba, and Vietnam Taber finds popular 
support, protracted conflict, politics, and use of terrain, as the most important facets in 
successful insurgency.26 
                                                 
21 Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 273. 
22 Samuel B. Griffith II, “Introduction” in Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, ed. and trans. by 
Samuel B. Griffith II (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press: 2000), 32.  
23 Max Boot, Invisible Armies: A Epic History of Guerilla Warfare Through Time (New York & 
London: Liverlight Publishing Corp., 2013), 613, 615. 
24 Jane Novak, “Comparative Counterinsurgency in Yemen,” Middle East Review of International 
Affairs 14, no. 3 (September 2010), 22. 
25 Mao Tse-Tung, Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press: 2000), 43. 
26 Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerilla Warfare (Washington, DC: Potomac 
Books, Inc, 2002), 6, 19, 39, 156.  
 6
The use of both COIN and CT, and the general overlap of strategies, by ROY give 
reason to also study CT strategy. Audrey Kurth Cronin’s How Terrorism Ends gauged the 
effectiveness of CT policies by statistical analysis of 457 terrorist organizations from 
1968–2006. She finds six ways—usually in some sort of combination—that terrorism 
ends. Cronin states the methods are: “decapitation, catching or killing the leader; 
negotiations, transition toward a legitimate political process; success, achieving the 
objective; failure, imploding, provoking a backlash or becoming marginalized; 
repression, crushing terrorism with force; and reorientation, transitioning to another 
modus operandi.”27 She finds that no group was defeated solely through repression. 
Cronin also dedicates a chapter to al Qaeda where she prescribes negotiations with 
regional affiliates while exploiting its mistakes to weaken its support base.28 Daniel 
Byman’s The Five Front War: The Better Way to fight a Global Jihad, identifies “five 
fronts” against jihadists. While U.S. centric, the fronts could be modified to a Yemeni 
perspective. Byman’s fronts are: the military to fight insurgent groups and training with 
allied governments; the war of ideas, using propaganda to “go negative” on insurgent 
groups; intelligence, working with locals; homeland defense (law enforcement); and 
finally democratic reform.29 Both Byman and Cronin suggest political routes will 
ultimately be more successful by stripping the base of supporters from the groups. A 
statistical study by Christopher Hewitt entitled The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Polices 
is interesting, but due to the inconsistencies in body counts and incident reporting, the 
method would be impossible to use in Yemen.30 
The literature on the Huthi movement is characterized by the small number of 
high quality work. Foremost is the RAND’s Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: 
The Huthi Phenomenon, which could be described as a bible on the Huthis. The work 
covers nearly every aspect of the group and conflict, including the sociocultural ecology 
                                                 
27 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Campaigns (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009) vi–ix. 
28 Ibid., vi–ix, 141,195. 
29 Daniel Byman, The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley and Sons, 2008), 3–4.  
30 Christopher Hewitt, The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Polices (Lanham, New York, London: 
University Press of America, 1984), 28–35.  
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of the conflict, weapons and tactics, organization, phases of the war, and government 
tactics.31 Lucas Winter wrote several of articles, detailing the Huthi-Government conflict 
that suggests that government policies more often than not escalate the situation.32 
The literature on AQAP is plentiful. While there is no definitive tome like the 
RAND study on the Huthis there are several good studies. First are W. Andrew Terrill’s 
aforementioned books for the Strategic Studies Institute. Importantly, Terrill tracks 
AQAP’s transition from terrorism to full blown insurgency in 2010.33 Gregory Johnsen’s 
The Last Refuge tracts the historical rise of AQAP starting with the Yemenis who 
traveled to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets, to the first insurgents who ruled parts of 
southern Yemen.34 Former Ambassador Edmund J. Hull gives the inside story of 
American and Yemeni policies on AQAP in High-Valued Target: Countering Al Qaeda 
in Yemen.35  
Chapter two will examines the groups using social movement theory (SMT) to 
reveal internal dynamics of AQAP and the Huthis and how the groups mobilize its 
support. A general understanding of SMT is required to analyze the three fundamental 
aspects of a social movement: political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures and 
cultural framing. The concepts are best explained in the excellent anthology by Doug 
McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald.36 A comparative study of SMT, edited 
by Quintan Wiktorowicz, of Islamist groups reveals the unique cultural features of Islam 
such as Friday prayers, study circles, terrorist groups, and nongovernment organizations 
                                                 
31 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery.  
32 Winter, “Wake of the Arab Spring.”; Lucas Winter, “The Ansar of Yemen: The Huthis and al-
Qaeda.” Small Wars Journal (May 2013), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-ansar-of-yemen-the-
huthis-and-al-qaeda.; Lucas Winter, “Conflict in Yemen: Simple People, Complicated Circumstances.” 
Middle East Policy 18, no. 1 (Spring 2011). 
33 Terrill, Conflicts in Yemen, 43–50; Terrill, Struggle for Yemen, 35. 
34 Gregory D. Johnsen, The Last Refuge (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013) 3–
18, 269–288. 
35 Edmund J. Hull, High-Valued Target: Countering Al Qaeda in Yemen (Washington, DC: Potomac 
Books, 2011). 
36 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction” in Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities and Cultural Framing, ed. Doug McAdam John 
D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1996). 
 8
that makes “a strong claim that Islamic activism is one of the most common examples of 
activism in the world.”37 
D. THESIS 
Why have Yemen’s COIN/CT polices been less effective against the Huthi 
movement compared to AQAP? This study finds the military’s poor counterinsurgency 
and counterterrorism policies, the international effort to combat AQAP, the Huthis’ 
ability to recruit and mobilize large numbers of followers, and the Huthi leadership’s 
pragmatic alliances gave the Huthis the advantage over AQAP and the Republican of 
Yemen. Those are not the only factors, but they are the most important ones in explaining 
why the Huthis are more successful than the AQAP in capturing, controlling, and 
governing territory. With four variables there are many lesser reasons, which will be 
explained in detail in the following chapters.  
At the commencement of this study, the superiority of Huthi insurgency was in 
question. At the time, the Huthis controlled Sadah governorate but at an extremely high 
cost. The poor, land locked governorate Sadah had tens of thousands killed, thousands of 
structures and farms destroyed, hundreds of thousands of people driven from their homes 
as internally displaced persons, and a decade of war. That changed in September and 
October when a blitzkrieg offense captured most of north-west Yemen. The changes 
meant additional research and re-writes for the author, but it also meant that the Huthis 
clearly had a more effective insurgency.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will analyze the effectiveness Yemen’s counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism (COIN/CT) policies by conducting a comparative study of ROY, the 
Huthis, and AQAP using a fusion of several common analytical methods. A comparative 
case study of two insurgencies fought in the same country with differing results will 
allow for an interesting and rigorous examination of Yemen’s counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism policies. While Yemen calls both groups “terrorists,” and uses both 
                                                 
37 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Introduction” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, 
ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 5.  
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COIN/CT tactics against the Huthis and AQAP, both organizations operate as 
insurgencies groups and I will treat them as such. AQAP does have a record of striking 
U.S. interests aboard but I will not focus on international terrorism. In sum, I will 
examine Yemeni COIN/CT polices and Huthi and AQAP insurgency strategies and 
tactics. 
Since the thesis is judging ROY’s policies based on the success the Huthis and 
AQAP, multiple variables must be considered. Since there is no agreed upon standard to 
measure effectiveness of policies, a Yemen specific model will be used that relies heavily 
on qualitative analysis. The qualitative analysis of the thesis will examine both the 
governments and the groups. The basic measure of success in this study will be the 
control of territory for all three groups. The development of the Huthis and AQAP 
organizations themselves will be evaluated using the historical record and social 
movement theory. Additional factors considered for the insurgent groups include 
ideologies, insurgency strategies and tactics, recruitment and popular support. Aspects of 
Yemen’s COIN/CT policies analyzed include strategy, legislation, organizational features 
and resources, implementation of policies and public support.  
This thesis will use principally secondary sources, books, and articles. Primary 
sources in the form of available data, legislation, government documents, published 
surveys and media reports will also be used. The information cutoff date is October 2014. 
The main analysis will run for roughly a decade starting in 2003. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters, including three that will focus on the four 
variables identified earlier. The first chapter is an introduction and updated version of the 
thesis proposal. The second chapter provides background information on the origins of 
the Huthis and AQAP, and uses SMT to understand why the Huthis have been more 
successful in recruiting and mobilizing members. The third chapter examines the 
effectiveness of Yemeni government’s COIN/CT policies by analyzing several factors: 
the strategy and legislation; the organization, resources and measures, and the public 
support for the government. The next chapter delves into the effectiveness of AQAP and 
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the Huthis’ insurgency strategies, a concise history of the development of the conflicts 
with the government, the organization and resources, public and outside support for the 
insurgent groups, and territorial gains and losses. Chapter V outlines Yemen’s 
international support for its COIN/CT policies. The final chapter will discuss and analyze 
the finding of the previous chapters and summarize the evidence backing the thesis. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF  
INSURGENTS IN YEMEN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter uses social movement theory (SMT) to analyze the Huthis and al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) ability to mobilize individuals to support its 
cause. SMT “focuses on groups as the proper unit of analysis in explaining collective 
action.”38 Three SMT concepts are used to analyze the Huthis and AQAP, political 
opportunity structure, mobilizing structure, and cultural framing. First, David S. Mayer 
and Debra C. Minkoff define political opportunity structure as, “exogenous factors [that] 
enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be 
advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for 
movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy.”39 Related to 
opportunity is threat, which Paul D. Almeida “denotes [as] the probability that existing 
benefits will be taken away or new harms inflicted if challenging groups fail to act 
collectively.”40 Second, are mobilizing structures which according to Glenn E. Robinson, 
“vary from the formal to the informal to the illegal. It is through these structures that 
movements recruit like-minded individuals, socialize new participants, overcome the free 
rider problem, and mobilize contention.”41 For high-risk activism Doug McAdams found 
that “participants were distinguished…on the basis of their (a) greater number of 
organizational affiliations, (b) higher levels of prior…activity, and (c) stronger and more 
extensive ties to other participants.”42 Third, are cultural frames that Mayer N. Zald 
defines as an “attempt to define the issues, invent metaphors, attribute blame [and] define 
                                                 
38 Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement,” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory 
Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington & Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 
114–5. 
39 David S. Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff “Conceptualizing Political Opportunity,” Social Forces 82, 
no. 4 (June 2004): 1457–8. 
40 Paul D. Almeida, “Opportunity Organizations and Threat Induced Contention: Protest Waves in 
Authorization Settings,” American Journal of Sociology 109, no. 2 (September 200): 347. 
41 Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement,” 116. 
42 Doug McAdam, “Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer,” American 
Journal of Sociology 92, no. 1 (July 1986): 64, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2779717. 
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tactics.”43 A social movement needs political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and 
frames in order to recruit and mobilize followers. Frames are the final element of the 
social movement tripartite. In order to become involved in a social movement there must 
be a grievance, and the belief that the social movement can remedy the problem. Social 
movements convince people they are part of the solution, and can remedy the grievance 
through a framing process.44 They tell people how to look at a problem that their 
grievances are due to a particular issue, and who is responsible. High-risk activism that 
includes violence requires additional justification and inspiration.45  
B. HUTHI MOVEMENT 
“Allahu Akbar! Death to America! Death of Israel! Curse the Jews! 
Victory for Islam!” 
—Huthi slogan.46 
The Huthi movement, also known as the Shabab al-Mumin (Believing Youth) 
(BY), or Ansar Allah, originated as a Zaydi revivalist and Islamist47 group in the early 
1990s in northern Yemen. After increasing repression from the Republic of Yemen 
(ROY) government the movement turned violent in 2004.48 Why did the Zaydi revivalist 
movement transition to a powerful insurgent group? To understand why, this section uses 
SMT to better understand the Huthi movement. First, I will explain how the BY/Huthis 
used political opportunity structures to change from a “community,” to a peaceful 
Islamist group, into a violent insurgency. Next, I will explain how the Huthis’ mobilizing 
                                                 
43 Mayer N. Zald, “Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing” in Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities and Cultural Framing, ed. Doug McAdam et al. (Cambridge 
University Press: 1996), 269. 
44 McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, “Introduction,” 5.  
45 Mohammed M. Hafez, “Marginalization to Massacres,” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement 
Theory Approach, ed. by Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2004), 45. 
46 Winter, “Wake of the Arab Spring,” 15. 
47 Shia Islamism is characterized strongly by communalism, defense of community from the state and 
non-state actors, and leadership by religious figures. International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism,” 
18–21. 
48 Winter, “Wake of the Arab Spring,” 13–14. 
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structures helped the movement gain a large following. Finally, I will examine some of 
the cultural framing utilized by the Huthis.  
1. Origins and Ideologies 
The history of northern Yemen and Zaydi Islam provide the foundation of the 
Huthi movement. Sadah is the religious center of the Zaydi Shia world. The Zaydi 
Imamate was first established in the Sadah region in 893 by Imam Yahya bin al-Husayn, 
a sayyid,49 and member of the Hashemite50 clan. The Zaydi Imamate lasted in one form 
or another for over 1000 years until overthrown in 1962 by Republican forces. A civil 
war ensued, with Royalist forces backed by Saudi Arabia fighting until defeated in 1970. 
Starting soon thereafter, as the popularity of the hierarchical Zaydi Islam declined, the 
popularity of the egalitarian Salafi Sunni sect grew.51  
Zaydism and the Yemeni Imamate practices contain unique tenets that influence 
the BY and Huthi movement. First, the 1000-year Yemeni Imamate practiced religious 
tolerance towards Sunnis in Yemen, which constitute a majority of the population 
(practicing the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence). This tolerance is rooted in the belief, 
which contrasts with other Shia sects, that the first three Sunni Caliphs were wrong, but 
not evil or sinful. Additionally, Zaydi worship is nearly identical to Sunni worship and 
Zaydis are permitted to pray in Sunni mosques.52 Zaydis, despite siding with Ali and his 
descendants, claim to be a Sunni school of jurisprudence, and not a Shia sect.53 Second, 
Zaydis also believe that an Imam54 should lead of the state. The Imam can be any sayyid 
who is a Zaydi scholar, a warrior, and a champion of justice. He must also publicly claim 
                                                 
49 Sayyid (sada pl.)— Honorific title for a descendent of Muhammad through Ali; member of Zaydi 
nobility. Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, xxiv.  
50 Hashemite—member of the Banu Hashim, a subclan of the larger Quraysh tribe, the tribe of the 
Prophet Muhammad. Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 67fn48. 
51 Winter, “Conflict in Yemen,” 105–6. 
52 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 64–6. 
53 Ibid., 67. 
54 Imam—(in Zaydism) legitimate hair of political rule. Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and 
Periphery, xx. 
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the role of Imam.55 Third, Zaydism teaches that is the duty of a Muslim to rebel against 
an unjust ruler. This contrasts with the official Saudi Salafist “political quietism” and 
loyalty under a corrupt and unjust ruler.56 It is easy to understand why a government 
would promote Saudi-style Salafism over Zaydism.  
2. Political Opportunity Structures 
The Huthis seized several political opportunities and responded to several threats 
that aided in its rise. The significant political opportunities and threats include the decline 
of Zaydi influence, political liberalization following the union of the Yemen Arab 
Republic (North Yemen) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South 
Yemen), government overreaction to the movement, military success of the Huthis in the 
Sadah Wars, and finally the Arab Spring.  
The roots of the Huthi movement date to the 1980s, when the “Zaydi community” 
formed under internal and external threats. In the 1970s and 1980s, the practice of 
Zaydism declined and was endangered by the expansion by Salafism.57 Zaydi studies had 
declined, with mostly older generations studying the traditional northern Yemeni form of 
Islam by the 1980s.58 At the same time, adherents viewed the sect in crisis with the rise 
of Salafist proselytizing from Saudi Arabia. The Salafists gained political power at the 
expense of the Zaydis and in some cases took over Zaydi mosques.59 Concurrently, 
tribalism declined in importance as regional trade and boarding schools helped foster an 
“imagined community” of northern Yemenis and Zaydis.60 By the end of the 1980s, the 
Zaydis felt their sect, with over 1000 years of practice, was under siege.  
                                                 
55 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 65; Winter, “Conflict in Yemen,” 105–6. 
56 Winter, “Conflict in Yemen,” 105–6. 
57 Yemen is about 65% Shafi’i (Sunni) and 35% Zaydi (Shia). U.S. Department of State, 2012 Yemen 
International Religious Freedom Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2012), 2. 
58 Winter, “Conflict in Yemen,” 106. 
59 Shelagh Weir, “A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen,” Middle East Report no. 204 
(Summer 1997), 22, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer204/clash-
fundamentalisms?ip_login_no_cache=7b1b39cbbb2fd4e68d47f3b357a77aa2. 
60 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 5. 
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The first opportunity utilized by the Zaydi community came in 1990, with the 
union of the two Yemens and the political liberalization that followed it.61 This 
opportunity is also related to the emergence of the social movement’s mobilizing 
structures explained in greater detail in the next section. Political liberalization gave 
prominent Zaydis space to organize and mobilize. In 1990, a political party using the 
name Hizb al-Haqq was founded that espoused Zaydi Islamist views and desired to 
reassert northern Yemen’s Zaydi identity.62 A youth Zaydi revivalist network was started 
in 1991, called the Believing Youth Club. By the end of the 1990s, the club had 18,000 
students in Sadah alone.63 The BY also administrated social welfare programs, which 
gave the BY leadership credibility in the Zaydi community.64  
The next exogenous factor that radically changed the movement was the threat 
from the government out of Sanaa. Angered by the Yemeni-American “global war on 
terror” alliance and the Iraq War, the BY engaged in anti-government protests and 
contentious collective action.65 During a 2003 anti-Iraq war protest outside the American 
Embassy, Huthi protestors started chanting the Huthi slogan with “Death to America!” 
Yemeni security then clashed with protestors.66 The Huthis handed out pamphlets calling 
President Saleh an American stooge. Supporters refused to pay taxes, cut the Sanaa-to-
Sadah Highway, and seized government buildings in Sadah. The government sent 
Brigadier General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar and his units into Sadah to restore order and 
arrest BY leader Husayn al-Huthi. Yemeni forces killed him in 2004 during an arrest 
attempt ending the first round of fighting.67  
Government repression went in full force in 2005. Security forces arrested 
hundreds of BY members, replaced Zaydi preachers with Salafists across Yemen, banned 
                                                 
61 Winter, “Wake of the Arab Spring,” 14. 
62 Winter, “Conflict in Yemen,” 106. 
63 Clark, Dancing on the Heads, 249. 
64 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 6–7. 
65 Clark, Dancing on the Heads, 249. 
66 Novak, “Comparative Counterinsurgency,” 15; Winter, “Conflict in Yemen,” 107; Terrill, Conflicts 
in Yemen, 17. 
67 Clark, Dancing on the Heads, 159, 249. 
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the main Zaydi holiday al-Ghadir, and confiscated all Zaydi related texts found.68 Many 
of the Riyadh-funded Salafist preachers openly called Zaydis heretics and apostates in the 
former Zaydi mosques.69 Approximately 35 percent of Yemen’s population, or nine 
million citizens, found their religion essentially outlawed by the state.70 The Yemeni 
government eventually backtracked, and the religious practices were re-legalized in 
2008.71 While the state may have thought these policies would crush the blossoming 
insurgency, it failed to take into account that one of the key tenants of Zaydism is 
according to Winter, is the “willingness to rise up against injustice and oppression.”72  
Badr al-Din al-Huthi’s son, Adb al Malik al-Huthi (who now leads), took the 
opportunity to rise up against the unjust Yemeni government, leading an armed faction of 
BY—the Huthis. He is said to command 7000 fighters.73 The Huthis and government 
continued to fight off and on from 2005 until 2008, with four rounds of fighting taking 
place during this time frame.74 The sixth and fiercest round started in November 2009. 
The Huthi fighters held off the combined might of the Yemeni military and Saudi 
Arabian forces that opened a second front in the north. The Huthis, who started as a grass 
roots Qur’anic study group, turned into a fighting force that is viewed as invincible on the 
Arabian Peninsula.75  
The Arab Spring provided an opportunity that the Huthis could not pass up. After 
government snipers shot into crowds of unarmed protestors in the capital, the government 
went into chaos with numerous defections. With President Saleh’s attention in the capital, 
Huthi forces were able to seize full control over most of Sadah governorate and bordering 
areas. The Huthis also took the opportunity to increase its pan-Yemen legitimacy by 
creating a political alliance with the Revolutionary Youth (student protestors) and the 
                                                 
68 Novak, “Comparative Counterinsurgency,” 15; Clark, Dancing on the Heads, 249. 
69 Terrill, Conflict in Yemens, 17. 
70 U.S. Department of State, Yemen International Religious Freedom Report, 2. 
71 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 66. 
72 Winter, “Wake of the Arab Spring,” 14. 
73 Novak, “Comparative Counterinsurgency,” 15. 
74 Winter, “Conflict in Yemen,” 103–4. 
75 Winter, “Wake of the Arab Spring,” 14. 
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Hirak. The Huthis also created a front political party, Hizab al-Umma. These moves 
during the Arab Spring gave the Huthis a shadow government in Sadah, a national pan-
Yemeni informal opposition bloc, and a formal political party.76 
At the start of the Arab Spring the Huthis were forced to articulate a clear political 
platform.77 The Arab Spring saw the political goals of three groups overlap, the Huthis, 
the Hirak, and the Revolutionary Youth.78 The Arab Spring recruits to the Huthi cause 
were young, urban, and educated. This urban Huthi base allied with the Hirak and 
Revolutionary Youth in opposition to the CCG transition plan.79 This new liberal base 
advocated “Huthi positions” at the UN-backed National Dialogue Conference (NDC), 
which also gave them a legitimate national and international voice.80 These Huthis 
wanted a federal democratic government with check and balances, political pluralism, 
and freedom of religion. Yemeni critics charge that the Huthis are repressive in areas 
under its control and do not live up to its so-called ideals.81 
The most recent opportunity arose in 2014. Clashes arose this time between the 
Huthis and AQAP and an anti-Huthi alliance comprised of allied bloc of Salafists, the 
Ahmar family,82 Islah,83 and Brig. General Ali Muhsin and his 301 Military Brigade. The 
Huthis found new allies with former President Saleh and his General People’s Congress 
(GPC). The Huthis and its allies defeated its enemies and gained popular support through 
implementing security, and law and order in areas under its control. 84 As fighting raged 
to the north of the capital, the Huthis mobilized supports to protest the removal of fuel 
                                                 
76 Winter, “Wake of the Arab Spring,” 14–6. 
77 International Crisis Group, “The Huthis: From Saada to Sana,” Middle East Report no. 154 (2014): 
2, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/yemen/154-the-huthis-
from-saada-to-sanaa.aspx. 
78 Winter. “Ansar of Yemen.” 
79 Winter, “Wake of the Arab Spring,” 16. 
80 The NDC is a representative committee, with multiple stakeholders, tasked with finding solutions to 
the government problems and writing a new constitution. http://www.ndc.ye/default.aspx; International 
Crisis Group, “The Huthis,” 2. 
81 International Crisis Group, “The Huthis,” i. 
82 The Amhars are Heads of the Hasid tribal confederation.  
83 Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood. 
84 International Crisis Group, “The Huthis,” 3–4. 
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subsidies and called for the government to resign.85 Brig. General Ali Muhsin’s soldiers 
and armed supporters of the Islah clashed with protestors. Huthi fighters responded to 
attack, defeating both parties after large numbers of security forces switched sides and 
fought with the Huthis against the Ali Muhsin-Islah alliance. The Huthis forced President 
Hadi to sign a power sharing agreement to make the Huthis part of the government. The 
Huthis included the Hirak in the spoils, as it is also a signatory.86  
3. Mobilizing Structures 
How did the BY and later the Huthi movement mobilize support for its cause? To 
help answer that question I will examine another SMT variable, mobilizing structures. 
The main BY mobilizing structures are religious education, youth study groups, and 
holiday gatherings.  
The initial informal mobilizing structure was the increased teaching of Zaydi 
doctrine, which increased the Zaydi collective identity amongst the youth. The 1990s saw 
a broadening of the base of students. Previously dominated by Hashemites and other 
sada87, teaching was opened to non-sada. Texts and pamphlets were also distributed to a 
newly literate youth along with audiocassettes for the masses. Zaydi primary schools and 
“scientific schools” were established by wealthy Zaydis and the al-Haqq party. Leaders 
of the movement established a new formal school for teaching the new ulama.88 Pro-
Zaydi teachers used Zaydi materials in state schools. The increased focus on Zaydi 
                                                 
85 “Call for Houthi civil disobedience in Yemen,” Al Jazeera (In English), Last updated: 31 Aug 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/call-houthi-civil-disobedience-yemen-
2014831212127650924.html. 
86 Mohammed Ghobari, “Houthis tighten grip on Yemen capital after swift capture, power-sharing 
deal,” Reuters, September 22, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/22/us-yemen-security-
idUSKCN0HH2BQ20140922?irpc=932; International Crisis Group, “Yemen, October 1, 2014,” 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-
database.aspx?CountryIDs=%7b9D2149C0-C350–40FC-BE12–7693FB454AEE%7d#results; “Yemen deal 
signed after Shiite rebels seize government,” AFP; “Yemen appoints new PM to end crisis,” al Jazeera (In 
English), Last updated: 13 Oct 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/new-yemeni-
prime-minister-appointed-20141013112111586298.html 
87 sada —plural of sayyid. Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, xxiv. 
88 Ulama (‘alim sing.) – religious scholars. Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, xxi 
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education helped foster a sense of Zaydi community and collective identity among the 
youth.89  
In addition to mass religious education efforts, a study group was founded by the 
al-Huthi family, the Believing Youth. Initially the apolitical group was more of an after 
school club, with studies, sports, and field trips. The BY innovated, departing radically 
from northern Yemeni (and Zaydi) tradition by practicing equality between Hashemites, 
sada, merchants, nontribal townsfolk, and tribal students.90 This helped draw youth that 
would otherwise be attracted to the Salafists for their relatively egalitarian ideology. By 
the mid-1990s, the BY had established 50 clubs across Sadah and other governorates.91 
As the BY gained popularity, it started a summer camp, that at its height served 15,000 
youth. Much like the after school club, the camp featured religious study with sports and 
drama classes.92  
The expanded Zaydi schools and BY after school clubs and camps were noted for 
the modern mode of association and activism. According to Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, 
the Huthis had helped shed the old hierarchical sociocultural structure by providing an 
“entirely new associational space for young Zaydis.”93 The BY built a support base 
across social classes in Sadah that the government failed to do.94 In the 1990s, the BY 
were able to create a large base of support among teenagers that would later be called 
upon to support collective action, including protests and calls to arms in the 2000s. 
During the protests against the War in Iraq and the Arab Spring, the movement attracted 
additional followers because it provided an outlet of expression against the regime.95  
                                                 
89 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 96–7. 
90 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 98–9, 101. 
91 Winter, “Conflict in Yemen,” 106. 
92 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 98–9. 
93 Ibid., 100. 
94 Winter, “Conflict in Yemen,” 106. 
95 Winter, “Wake of the Arab Spring,” 16. 
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The Huthis used large Id al-Ghadir gatherings as rallies for Zaydi revivalism.96 Id 
al-Ghadir is the day that Muhammad appointed Ali as his successor according to Shia 
tradition. The holiday was celebrated in Huthi controlled territory after it was outlawed in 
early 2000s. The outlawing Id al-Ghadir backfired on the ROY, because when the holiday 
was re-legalized in 2008 large celebrations were held across Yemen where Shafi’is, 
Isma’ilis, and Zaydis joined together in solitary against oppression. Salmoni, Loidolt, and 
Wells state that, “Husayn al-Huthi’s use of these holidays to decry [ROY] actions and 
mobilize supporters illustrates his calculations and highlights the local friction between 
Zaydis and Wahhabis [Salafists], as well as between Zaydis and the state.”97 Recent 
videos of the holiday show tens of thousands gathered to see current Huthi leader ‘Adb 
al-Malik al-Huthi indoctrinate and mobilize his supporters. 98  
4. Cultural Framing 
The BY, and later the Huthis, framed different situations as they arose. Some 
frames came and went—but that is expected from a group that started out playing soccer 
after school to fighting an armed conflict. The main Huthi frames are: appeal to Yemeni 
tradition, revival of Zaydism, freedom of religion, access to government funds for 
development, and most importantly the defense of the community. Mao argues that 
political goals are more important than military goals in a revolution.99 That is also true 
for a counter-revolution and the Yemeni government has actively engaged in framing 
contests with the Huthis. I will also include the government’s framing contests in this 
section. 
Before I examine the main frames I want to address the Huthi slogan: “Allahu 
Akbar! Death to America! Death of Israel! Curse the Jews! Victory for Islam!”100 
According to Winter, the slogan aligns with Husayn al-Huthi’s message of “sharp 
political criticism of both local and international actors, crafting a historically rooted 
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98 Ibid., xxii, 66, 116, 218. 
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100Winter, “Wake of the Arab Spring,” 15. 
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discourse of justice and empowerment.”101 This “bumper sticker” version of the Huthi 
grievances is chanted in the mosques after Friday prayers and at various anti-government 
and anti-war protests.102 Despite the rather clear attacks on America and Israel, the 
slogan is meant as a criticism of President Saleh and his “alliance” with America. The 
chant sums up the Huthi conspiracy theory of an “American-Jewish-Sunni” alliance 
against Zaydis.103 Notwithstanding its overt slogans, the Huthis have not conducted a 
terrorist attack against U.S. or Israeli interests, or against the tiny Jewish population in 
Yemen.104 The Huthi fight is against the Yemeni government and the Salafists.  
The use of the incendiary slogan gave the ROY government an easy way to 
contest the frame by claiming the Huthis are violent, radical, terrorists.105 By linking the 
group in 2003 to the global war on terror, the government also justifies its brutal 
counterinsurgency to the rest of the country and world.106 The government’s framing is 
not overly convincing since the Huthi attacks have only targeted ROY and KSA military 
and government targets and rival militias. The international community, including the 
U.S., has pressured the Yemeni government to make peace with the Huthis and focus on 
real terrorists such as AQAP, suggesting that outsiders disagree with the “terrorist” 
label.107 
The encroachment of the Salafists in the Zaydi heartland has been met with two 
different, yet related frames by the BY and later Huthis. First, the Zaydis have framed the 
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“foreign” Saudi Salafists as attacking the traditional Zaydi religion.108 Second, the Zaydis 
framed the attack in secular terms, arguing that it is a form of Saudi imperialism.109 The 
revivalists are acting in a reactionary fashion by urging for the return to the historical 
practices of the 1000-year Zaydi regime. The frames resonated with the population since 
they were the driving factors in the creation of the Zaydi revivalist social movement, 
which was highly popular.110 The Huthis are proclaiming a return to the true northern 
Yemeni traditions in which Zaydis were in power, an appealing frame for currently 
powerless Zaydis.  
The Yemeni government started a framing contest on political-religious grounds 
after the 2003 protests. The government claimed that the Huthi family, of the old royal 
Hashemite clan, wanted to reinstate the old Imamate and create a theocratic state.111 The 
Huthis have not made such proclamations and stated its allegiance to the Republican 
system, the laws of the country, and the constitution. Since Badr al-Din al-Huthi qualified 
as an Imam (all he had to do was proclaim it), it seems reasonable that he would have if 
he wanted proclaim a new imamate. The government has also accused the Huthis of 
being under “foreign” influence by allying with Iran, Hezbollah, Libya, Iraq, and Eritrea. 
With the exception of matériel from Iran, Yemen has provided no evidence of foreign 
assistance. The ROY government also accused the Huthis of converting to the “foreign” 
Twelver (Shia) Islam, and that Husayn al-Huthi claimed he was the Mahdi.112 Husayn al-
Huthi complained about Twelvers trying to convert Zaydis and Zaydis do not believe in 
the Mahdi so these claims probably did little to drive Zaydis from the cause.113  
Similar to the demands of its current allies in the Hirak, the Huthis demand the 
end of corruption and government abuses, enfranchisement, equal access to government 
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funds, freedom of religion, equality, and rule of law.114 ROY did not address or 
acknowledge the issues until the Arab Spring protests which the Huthis strongly 
supported. The Huthis, Revolutionary Youth and Hirak boycotted the one-man election 
and post-Saleh transition.115  
The most powerful frame uses the Zaydi cultural practice of the duty of a Muslim 
to rebel against an unjust ruler. The Huthis have portrayed the fight as a defense against 
the heavy-handed ROY military.116 The death and destruction wrought by the ROY 
military validates the Huthi’s claims. The fighting in Sadah displaced 300,000 residences, 
destroyed 9,000 structures, and killed 25,000.117 The ROY counter-framed the battle as 
fighting an outlaw group engaged in open rebellion, allied with foreign elements—Iran 
and Hezbollah—intent on creation of a new Zaydi state.118  
5. Conclusion 
The BY/Huthi movement started as a community in the northern Yemen. Through 
the framing of grievances after the liberalization of the political system Zaydi elites were 
able to mobilize through educational, social, and religious networks. Through the creation 
of the political party and Believing Youth Club tens of thousands of Zaydis were able to 
express their discontent with the system through the political process, and more 
importantly through contentious collective action in the form of protests and disruptive 
activities. The ROY’s repression strengthened the movement with tens of thousands 
supporting the thousands of Huthi fighters defending its territory. During the Arab 
Spring, the Huthi movement created pan-Yemeni allies with groups holding similar 
grievances, including the Revolutionary Youth and the Hirak. The widespread 
displeasure with the Yemeni government even led to Shafi’is, Isma’ilis, and Zaydis to 
join together to celebrate a Shia holiday. 
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The Huthi militia was borne out of repression, and was thus a creation of ROY’s 
actions. It is too soon to tell if the Huthis will use the power sharing agreement to disarm 
and fully engage in the Yemeni political system or to continue as a militant group. 
Regardless, the Huthis experienced remarkable growth as a social movement deftly 
utilizing political opportunities as they arose; framing that resonates with the populace, 
and used a variety of mobilizing structures. 
C. AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 
“Since 1990 when the Americans occupied the land of revelation, the 
youth of the Peninsula of Islam are defending their religion, their holy 
places and their land, from which, their Messenger, peace be upon him, 
ordered [his followers] to expel the unbelievers. They have executed a  
few operations against the Americans in and out of the Arabian Peninsula. 
The most famous are the Ulaya, al-Khobar, East Riyadh, USS Cole, 
Limburg, and the assassination of U.S. soldiers in the island of Faylakah in 
Kuwait. The leaders of al-Qa`ida such as Shaykh al-Battar Yusuf al-
`Uyairi, `Abdul `Aziz al-Miqrin, and Shaykh Abu `Ali al-Harithi and 
others led this war against the Americans in and outside of the Arabian 
Peninsula.”119 
— Nasir Al-Wuhayshi 
This section explains the development of the Jihadi-Salafism in Yemen movement 
starting with the return of the Afghan-Arabs120 through the formation of the Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Arab Spring. The group known as AQAP 
originated in 2009 with the announcement of the merger of the Yemeni Al Qaeda in the 
Southern Arabian Peninsula (AQSAP)121 and the Saudi Arabian Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula.122 AQAP soon after commenced a full-blown insurgency in southern Yemen. 
The Jihadi-Salafism movement in Yemen is not a simple liner development but ebbed 
and followed depending on political opportunities and threats. 
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1. Origins and Ideologies 
Jihadi-Salafism is the ideology that spawned AQAP, so the religious ideology 
needs explanation. Jihadi-Salafism’s main goal is to rally Muslims to defend other 
Muslims around the world from perceived non-Muslim aggression.123 Jihadi-Salafism is 
a fusion of two ideologies the first being Salafism which Gilles Kepel describes as, “a 
school of thought which surfaced in the second half of the nineteenth century as a 
reaction to the spread of European ideas. It advocated a return to the traditions of the 
devout ancestor (salaf in Arabic).” Kepel further notes that modern (neo-) Salafists 
believe that the Quran and Hadith were to be understood in the most traditional and literal 
interpretation. The Salafi-Jihadists add the requirement of absolute dedication to Jihad.124 
Mohammed M. Hafez finds Jihadi-Salafism “characterized by five features.” First, they 
believe in the unity of God (tawhid) or monotheism. Second, Jihadi-Salafists accentuate 
Allah’s sovereignty (hakimiyyat Allah) over everything. Third, the Jihadi-Salafists 
denounce any innovations (bida) to Islam as violations to Allah’s unity or sovereignty. 
Fourth, Jihadi-Salafists may excommunicate (takfir) any Muslim they believe violated 
the faith by “the heart, tongue and action.” Someone who is thus judged to be kafir is an 
apostate or infidel. Finally, Jihadi-Salafism emphasizes the importance of a classic, early 
Islam definition of jihad to the faith. Muslims must wage jihad against infidel and 
apostate regimes.125 
The movement in Yemen has at times fused their Jihadi-Salafism with another 
ideology called revolutionary Islamism. Hafez defines revolutionary Islam as an ideology 
that  
seeks to transform the existing political order in any given state or national 
government through mass mobilization or violent activism. Revolutionary 
                                                 
123 Mohammed M. Hafez, “Illegitimate Governance: The Roots of Islamist Radicalization in the 
MENA,” in Governance in Middle East and North Africa: A Handbook, ed. Abbas Kadhim (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2012), 94. 
124 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, trans. Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 219–220.  
125 Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2007), 64–70.  
 26
Islamists target their own governments and societies in order to overthrow 
the secular system and establish an Islamic order in its place.126  
Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula-Saudi Arabia (AQAP-SA), AQSAP and the 
combined AQAP drifted towards a hybrid Jihadi-Salafism/revolutionary Islamism 
ideology that resulted in attacks on Muslims and non-Muslims.127 This hybridization was 
met with some controversy as some Jihadists objected to targeting the Yemeni or Saudi 
government while Americans were in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is a clear case for 
defensive Jihad in those lands. Even ordinary Muslims could not understand the 
reasoning. According to Gregory D. Johnsen, “if al Qaeda wanted to kill Americans, they 
wondered, why didn’t they go to Iraq?”128 Al Qaeda lost popular support after attacking 
Muslims inside Saudi Arabia and Yemen.129 
2. Political Opportunity Structures 
The Jihadi-Salafists seized several political opportunities and responded to several 
threats that aided in mobilizing supporters in the past two-and-half decades. The 
noteworthy political opportunities and threats include the Yemeni state sponsored 
Afghan-Arab Islamic Jihad in Yemen (IJY); the 1994 Civil War that used IJY units in the 
Aden campaign; the creation of the Aden Abyan Islamic Army in reaction to government 
threats; the permissive atmosphere that allowed al Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) to operate; 
the Yemeni and American crackdown after the USS Cole bombing and 9/11; the 2006 
prison break that revived al Qaeda and the merger of the Yemeni and Saudi branches in 
AQAP; and finally, the Arab Spring and AQAP’s emergence as an insurgent group.  
The story of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula starts much in the same way as the 
original bin Laden led al Qaeda, with the end of the Soviet War in Afghanistan. Starting 
in the late 1980s, the returning Afghan-Arabs, who had converted to Jihadi-Salafism, 
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where repatriated by President Saleh in North Yemen (YAR). President Saleh used the 
Afghan-Arabs to wage jihad against the “godless” Soviet-backed Marxist People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).130 Osama bin Laden reportedly diverted funds, 
arms, and men to assist in the cause.131 Soon thereafter, the two Yemens united to form 
the Republic of Yemen (ROY). Tariq al-Fadhli, a bin Laden associate, returned to his 
home in Zinjibar where his grandfather was once Sultan. Encouraged by President Saleh 
and Osama bin Laden, al-Fadhli and fighters loyal to bin Laden took advantage of the 
political opportunity and formed the Islamic Jihad in Yemen (IJY).132 With presidential 
backing, the IJY started assassinating former and current officials in the Yemeni Socialist 
Party (YSP).133 IJY’s first attack against the “far” enemy134 occurred in 1992, with the 
bombing of two hotels in Aden housing American troops transiting to Somalia. The 
attacks resulted in the deaths of two Yemenis and one Australian and the arrest of al-
Fadhli.135 The ISY continued its attacks on socialists in the south, but would find greater 
opportunity with the 1994 Civil War.  
The 1994 Civil War broke out when southern YSP leaders, having “buyers 
regret,” attempted to secede from the northern dominated ROY. During the 10 week civil 
war the ROY forces crushed the rebels.136 To accomplish its victory, the ROY 
government freed al-Fadhli and made him a colonel in charge of the thousands IJY 
irregulars known as the Second Army Brigade. The bearded and undisciplined Afghan-
Arabs, tribesmen, and Islamists ransacked Aden, destroying western, socialist, and “un-
Islamic” buildings. Shariah law was implemented and floggings ensued. Forces looted 
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everything from garbage trucks to door knobs.137 Aden was soon brought under 
government control and the IJY was dissolved. Former IJY members returned home or 
were rewarded with jobs in the military, security forces, or civil government.138 The IJY 
involvement in the war had two lasting effects. First, many southerners still bear a grudge 
against bin Laden (and al Qaeda) because of his role as a financer of IJY ($20 million 
total.)139 Second, the “selling out” of most of the IJY members lead to the creation of the 
more radical Aden Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA).140 
Feeling betrayed and threatened by the YAR government, the AAIA was founded 
by another Afghan-Arab, Abu Hassan al-Mihdar, notorious London-based Finsbury 
Mosque Imam Abu Hamza al-Misri, and a small number of Jihadi-Salafists in 1994. With 
the threats from old socialists gone, the ROY government deported 14,000 Afghan-
Arabs. Others departed on their own to fight in the Afghan Civil War, Bosnia, Somalia, 
Tajikistan or Chechnya. The early al Qaeda affiliate was mostly a failure. The group 
attacked mostly civilians, while avoiding Yemeni security and Western hard targets. The 
killing of nuns and tourists starting in 1998 led to a swift crackdown with most of the 
group killed or arrested by Yemeni forces by 1999.141 AAIA were blamed for the 
bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, an act carried out by a far more dangerous group, al 
Qaeda in Yemen (AQY).142  
AQY started as more of an al Qaeda cell than an affiliate when it was founded in 
1998. Osama bin Laden called Yemen the “near ideal jihadi sanctuary.”143 The cell, led 
by Qaid Sinan al-Harithi, provided support for bin Laden’s bombing of the U.S. 
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embassies in Tanzania and Kenya before carrying out its first (successful)144 attack with 
the infamous USS Cole bombing.145 The bombing had immediate blowback when 
skyrocketing insurance rates kept many ships out of Aden.146 While the attack, coupled 
with 9/11, helped with recruitment it did not achieve mass popular support bin Laden 
craved.147 The final major attack by AQY was on the French oil tanker MV Limburg, a 
maritime suicide operation that killed one.148 The maritime bombings and 9/11 soon 
ended the permissive environment enjoyed by AQY. Soon thereafter the ROY and the 
U.S. coordinated a quick decapitation campaign. 
Less than a month after the October 2002 MV Limburg bombing, an air strike 
killed AQY leader al-Harithi.149 The decapitation campaign involving the U.S., Yemen 
and, other Arab countries, succeed in arresting all of AQY’s leaders, and detained dozens 
of members by 2004.150  Foreign jihadists, 600 in total, were arrested and deported by the 
end of 2002.151 The campaign destroyed AQY, and al Qaeda was not heard from again 
until 2006.152 During the same period, the Brigadier General Ali Muhsin encouraged 
jihadists to fight in Iraq.153 While imprisoning radicals and sending fighters to Iraq 
created calm in Yemen, it proved to be the calm before the storm.  
Al Qaeda in the lands of Yemen (AQLY) was born in a Political Organization 
(PSO) prison. The imprisoned members of AQY and other radicals started clandestine 
study circles. The group, led by Nasir al-Wuhayshi, studied the Quran and Jihadi-
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Salafism doctrine, and recruited dozens of other prisoners.154 The setting was nearly 
perfect for radicalization and recruitment; prisoners were isolated from outside society, 
imprisoned without trial and had nothing better to do than talk. A. Dalgaard-Nielsen 
notes, “group bonding and peer pressure reinforce[s] the emerging commitment of the 
joiner,” and small groups create more radical views.155 In 2006, nearly two dozen men 
escaped the prison. Soon after, six were killed and 11 were captured, but the remaining 
six made up the new leadership of AQLY. Its ranks were swelled with returning Iraq 
veterans. A year later in 2007, members of AQAP-SA started fleeing from Saudi forces 
into Yemen.156 The rechristened al Qaeda in the South Arabian Peninsula (AQSAP) 
started targeting western and Yemeni targets.157 In 2009, the remaining Saudis merged its 
branch with the Yemeni one becoming AQAP. A series of failed terrorist operations 
followed.158  
The next political opportunity for AQAP came in early 2011, when the Arab 
Spring protests weakened and destabilized the ROY government.159 AQAP decided to 
upgrade from terrorist tactics to a full blown insurgency. It wanted to rule territory so in 
April 2011, it created a front organization (or possibly an insurgent wing) called Ansar al 
Shariah (ASY). AQAP religious chief Sheikh Abu Zubayr Adil bin Abdullah al-Abab 
explained the rebranding, “the name Ansar al Shariah is what we use to introduce 
                                                 
154 Johnsen, Last Refuge, 160–5. 
155 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not 
Know,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 9 (2010): 802–803. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.501423. 
156 Terrill, Struggle for Yemen, 25–6. 
157 Koehler-Derrick, False Foundation, 36; Clark, Heads of Snakes, 206. 
158 The failed terrorist attacks, while important for counterterrorism studies, are not really relevant for 
the SMT study. These attacks include the August 2009 Rectum-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 
attack on Saudi Prince Nayef, the attempted Christmas 2009 Underwear-Borne IED bombing of a 
passenger plane, and the October 2010 attempted Fed-Ex Printer-Borne IED attack. A concise history can 
be found in: Masters and Laub, “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-
arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369. 
159 Masters and Laub, “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” 4. 
 31
ourselves in areas where we work to tell people about our work and goals.”160 The 
rebranding was required after AQAP’s seizure of the town Lawder in August 2010. 
During the short reign, locals reported heavy indoctrination and the enforcement of a 
brutal version of shariah that included, according to Terrill, “crucifixions, public 
beheadings, amputations, and floggings.” The indoctrination was not enough to convince 
the population to accept AQAP as its rulers, and the populace soon sided with the 
government forces. After the government drove AQAP out of Lawder, residents formed 
an armed militia called a Popular Committee that fought alongside the military during the 
Second Battle of Lawder.161 
After the second loss in Lawder, AQAP looked southward to Jaar and Zinjibar. 
“ASY” seized the towns from the government weakened by the Arab Spring in March 
and May 2011 respectively. The jihadists had mobilized hundreds of fighters after the 
two brief battles of Lawder. The closest reinforcements were loyal to Brig. General Ali 
Muhsin who had sided with the protestors against President Saleh and refused to help. In 
Jaar, away from the front lines in Zinjibar, AQAP won over support by constructing 
water lines and an electrical grid. Only after U.S. and Saudi support and pressure did  
Ali Muhsin’s men intervene.162 In May 2012, ROY forces 20,000 strong and backed  
by Popular Committees started a counter-offensive and by June 2012 retook the towns. 
Before fleeing, ASY mined the perimeter of Jaar, which resulted in the deaths of  
81 residents. A suicide bomber later killed 45 members of the Jaar Popular Committees. 
163 What little good will AQAP/ASY earned in Jaar and Zinjibar was lost with attacks on 
the population.  
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The Yemeni Jihadi-Salafists’ use of political opportunities and structures did little 
to gain mass support for the movement. The movement also made mistakes from the 
sacking of Aden to the reappraisals on the citizens of Jaar that hurt its standing in Yemen.  
3. Mobilizing Structures 
How did the Yemeni Jihadi-Salafists mobilize support its cause? After all, Jihad is 
a high risk form of activism. The main Yemeni Jihadi-Salafists’ mobilizing structures are 
the mosque, the tribe and social ties, later the Internet, and at one point the state. 164 
Proselytization and preaching is a prerequisite to recruitment. A majority of 
Yemenis practice the Shafi’i (Sunni) school of jurisprudence while in northern highlands 
Zaydi (Shia) Islam makes up a significant minority.165 The large majority of non-Salafi 
Muslims presents a challenge in the realm of recruiting. The individual must convert to 
Salafism before they would consider joining the Jihadi-Salafists. Salafist proselytization 
started in the 1970s financed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Some Yemenis 
relate the spread of Salafism as a form of Saudi imperialism.166 Additionally, the spread 
of the new ideology has stoked sectarian tensions in Yemen since the Salafists oppose 
both the Zaydis and Shafi’is. Salafists established or took over schools, study groups, and 
mosques.167 Johnsen found that by the late nineties at least 600,000 Yemenis had 
graduated from private Salafist religious institutions.168 Salafists also gained key 
positions in state schools and were able teach its version of Islam.169 After conversion, 
the Jihadi-Salafists must also compete with Islah, the Islamist political party, for 
followers. The party allows for a legal outlet for opposition to the Yemen ruling coalition, 
the General People’s Congress (GPC).170 Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan 
Wiktorowicz find that “many studies have substantiated the claim that the more 
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accessible the state, even an authoritarian state, the less likely the opposition will 
coalesce around a violent strategy,” further weakening recruiting efforts for the 
Jihadists.171 Proselytizing and conversions to the Salafism are not enough to mobilize 
people to join the Jihadi-Salafists, but the process can be viewed as a prerequisite to 
mobilization in Yemen. Jihadi-Salafists must also radicalize while recruiting and 
mobilizing followers. 
The mosque and study groups are important sources of radicalization and 
recruitment. During the 1980s clerics across the country preached jihad against the Soviet 
Union, some telling stories of angels fighting alongside the mujahedeen. Afghan-Arabs 
were important in creating IJY, AAIA, and AQY.172 Later Johnsen found that Jihadi-
Salafists clerics would preach wherever they could, to include “unfinished mosques…and 
in tiny back rooms of sympathetic shopkeepers.”173 These mosques and study groups also 
created what McAdam calls “extensive ties to other participants” required for high-risk 
activism.174  
The second source of recruitment is Yemeni tribes. In the Soviet War in 
Afghanistan era, tribal sheikhs helped channel members to Afghanistan.175 During the 
1994 Civil War southern tribesmen joined the IJY, although it appears the tribesmen 
motivation may have been out of greed or revenge against the YSP. Most quit IJY when 
the war was over.176 A 2011 Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) report argues that al 
Qaeda’s transnational pan-Islamic ideology is a weakness, since tribes are concerned with 
local issues and jihadist ideology alienates them from broad-based tribal support in 
Yemen.177 Additionally, one of AQC’s main goals according to Abu Bakr Naji’s The 
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Management of Savagery, is the elimination of tribes.178 Unlike the Huthis who ally with 
tribes, AQAP rule would subordinate the tribal leadership, which goes against tribal 
interests and would likely lead to armed conflict between the tribes and AQAP.179 These 
two factors probably limit tribal recruitment which is reflected in a CTC study which 
finds most members of AQAP do not have links to tribes in AQAP’s area of 
operations.180  
Another channel of mobilizing fighters included, at various times, the Yemeni 
Government. During the war in Afghanistan, Brig. General Ali Muhsin recruited jihadists 
for Osama bin Laden.181 As previously stated, the government employed IYJ during the 
1994 Civil War.182 Ali Muhsin also funneled an estimated 2000 jihadists into Iraq 
starting in 2003.183 Novak accuses Ali Muhsin of hiring “jihadi mercenaries during the 
Sadah War against the Huthi rebels,” but the current state of war with AQAP and change 
in ROY leadership has probably closed the door on government mobilization.184 
Other minor mobilizing structures included training camps and propaganda 
magazines. While camps can be used to further radicalize and indoctrinate recruits, the 
remote and clandestine nature of the camps suggests that recruits have already chosen the 
path to jihad before arrival. The camps primarily provide military and terrorist tactical 
training to recruits and due to air strikes are now small and temporary.185 Al Qaeda has 
produced multiple propaganda magazines and treatises on the Internet to mobilize 
supporters and more importantly frame issues.186 Michael Page, Lara Challita, and 
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Alistair Harris could not determine the extent to which the Internet is successful at 
mobilizing supporters. Only 2.5 percent of Yemenis have access to the Internet and only 
50 percent are literate. Pamphleting and reading jihadi literature out loud at qat chews are 
other reported methods of distribution.187 
4. Cultural Framing 
Jihadi-Salafists used several frames since the 1980s. Anti-communist frames were 
undoubtedly important early in the Jihadi-Salafism cause, but since communism is no 
longer an active cause I will focus on other frames. Additionally, IJY was noted for poor 
messaging.188 The main Jihadi-Salafism frames in Yemen are: the Crusader-Zionist 
Alliance, the apostate YAR and KSA Governments, suffering, “tribal honor and deeply-
felt religious sentiment,”189 and jihad as the solution. 
Alistair Harris’ analysis of al Qaeda’s publications,190 the main source of its 
propaganda, finds that al Qaeda “provide both diagnostic and prognostic frameworks to 
mobilize followers and potential recruits into collective action.”191 Together, the frames 
integrate popular local and global grievances into a “single narrative” that proscribes 
jihad (and later an Islamic State) as the solution to the problem.192 Of course boiling 
down all grievances into one solution is not without risk. Opponents and competitors 
such as Hirak, Islah, the Revolutionary Youth, and tribes compete with al Qaeda’s 
prognostic frames. Additionally, trying to fuse local grievances into al Qaeda’s pan-
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Islamic agenda can lead to confusing messaging.193 Jihad against the government of 
Yemen will not as Harris explains, “improve governmental responsiveness, 
accountability, service provision, or development,” which are the public’s main 
concerns.194  
The Crusader-Zionist Alliance, the apostate YAR and KSA governments, and 
suffering are linked. The Jihadi-Salafists in Yemen argue that Israel and the West support 
un-Islamic governments, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The failure of these governments to 
help their people or implement shariah law causes all the problems in the Muslim world. 
The propagandists further argue everything wrong in the world is due to the lack of the 
Islamic State. Individual local issues of suffering are used as examples of the effects of 
the Crusader-Zionist Alliance and apostate regimes. Palestine serves as a cause célèbre 
for the Jihadists.195  
Al Qaeda appeals to tribal honor and religion when framing issues.196 Al Qaeda’s 
statements often praise, shame, or challenge tribes in order to rally them to the Jihadi-
Salafist cause. The CTC found that the efforts to compel the tribes into action did little to 
win mass support of any tribe.197 As explained in the background, religion is the main 
justification for the Jihadi-Salafist cause, and it integrated into all other frames. 
According to Page, Challita, and Harris, al Qaeda uses (Jihadi-Salafist) Islamic doctrine 
to “justify and legitimize its acts of violence” and to add religious credibly to the 
group.198 Jihadi-Salafists appeal to fellow Muslims to fight for the cause.199 
Jihad is the solution.200 This “solution” to all the problems is further explained by 
al-wala wa al-bara (association and dissociation). According to Jihadi-Salafists, Muslims 
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must support the jihadists by resisting secularization (dissociation) and advocating for 
shariah (association).201 Anyone, regardless of age, gender, or ability, is capable of 
support. In addition to fighters, according to AQAP founding member Qassem al-Raymi, 
the cause needs other professions including “educators, door-to-door salesmen, and 
farmers.”202 Muslims must all withdraw support for apostate regimes.203 
Page, Challita, and Harris argue that the grievances and diagnostic frameworks 
cited by Jihadi-Salafist groups often have a legitimate base, but the prognostic 
framework, jihad against the West and “apostate” regimes and establishment of a global 
Islamic state, is increasingly rejected by most Muslims.204 While Muslims have little love 
for the West, a large majority of Muslims dislike al Qaeda even more. The support of al 
Qaeda continues to fall, suggesting that the old cliché “actions speak louder than words” 
is true.205  
5. Conclusion 
AQAP has shown the capacity to mobilize thousands of young men to wage jihad 
in Yemen but lasting support was difficult to maintain. AQAP’s ability govern captured 
territory has thus far been limited. As a high-risk movement, AQAP relies on hybrid of 
local and pan-Islamic frames to mobilize support. The frames question the legitimacy and 
competency of Yemeni rule while highlighting the suffering of ordinary Muslims under 
the apostate regime. Implementing a brutal form of governance while undermining tribal 
structures will likely to continue to create a backlash against AQAP that will cause 
AQAP to lose what little popular support it may have. Highlighting the suffering of those 
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under AQAP dominance and AQC’s anti-trial propaganda may be successful counter 
frames against the group. The fusion of global and local frames can also lead to 
incoherent messaging. AQAP will probably find it difficult to find mass support due to 
the plethora of competing opposition groups, including the Islamist Islah political party. 
D. CONCLUSION /ANALYSIS 
The Huthi social movement has been more successful at recruiting and mobilizing 
supporters than AQAP. A comparison of the two movements reveals several key 
differences which may explain why the Huthis have achieved mass support in parts of 
northern Yemen and AQAP struggles in its area of operations. First, the Huthis created a 
large base of support before engaging in what can be labeled as self-defense. The BY 
graduated students for a decade prior to the War in Iraq protests launched a government 
crackdown. AQAP and the Jihadi-Salafism with its roots in Afghanistan tried to win 
support through violence. IJY recruited many fighters in the civil war but most quit after 
the war was over. AQAP’s southern campaign has recruited young men from across 
Yemen but repulsed locals with its bloodthirstiness. The greatest difference in reactions 
to political opportunities was during the Arab Spring. Both groups seized land, but the 
Huthis also worked to win over protestors and made alliances with other opposition 
groups. There are notable differences in framing also. The Huthis have emphasized local 
grievances and suggested local solutions. AQAP fuses local with pan-Islam in its frames 
and rely heavily on jihad as the solution. The Huthis also have the advantage of a more 
traditional ideology, whereas AQAP relies on a more recently created and transnational 
Jihadi-Salafism doctrine. Additionally, the stated Huthi demands are reactionary and anti-
government, but to not advocate secession while AQAP is revolutionary, anti-
government and anti-tribal.  
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III. COUNTERINSURGENCY/COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN 
“To have an impact, a strategy must be coherent, organized, and reflected 
in the state’s institutions... Like terrorist groups, moreover, a state’s 
strategy must be flexible and innovative... In addition to building 
institutional support, leaders must also help shape public opinion to ensure 
popular support for counterterrorism in general and the strategy in 
particular. Political leaders must also give counterterrorism appropriate 
priority, making concessions on other objectives as necessary.”  
—Daniel Byman.206  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The chapter will examine three distinct factors affecting the Republic of Yemen’s 
(ROY) wars against the Huthis and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). First, the 
government’s strategy is analyzed using Audrey Kurth’s principles, and the legal frame-
work used to fight terrorism will be explained. Second, the Yemeni government’s 
military and security organizations, resources, and measures will be considered. Finally, 
this chapter will outline public support for the Yemeni government. This chapter will also 
note any differences in strategy or prosecution of the two wars. The lack of reporting 
from Yemeni war zones, the lack unbiased reporting, and limited public polling makes 
analysis of Yemen counterinsurgency and counterterrorism policies difficult.207 
B. STRATEGY AND LEGISLATION 
Yemen used a variety of strategies to combat the Huthis and al Qaeda. The 
strategies favor the military paradigm over the law enforcement paradigm. This is largely 
due the weak legal framework in Yemen for fighting an insurgency and terrorism. 
Yemen’s strategy uses decapitation (of leadership), negotiations, and repression. 
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1. Strategy 
Cronin’s How Terrorism Ends gauged the effectiveness of CT policies by 
statistical analysis of 457 terrorist organizations from 1968–2006. She finds six ways—
usually in some sort of combination—which terrorism ends. According to Corin, the 
methods are: “decapitation, catching or killing the leader; negotiations, transition toward 
a legitimate political process; success, achieving the objective; failure, imploding, 
provoking a backlash or becoming marginalized; repression, crushing terrorism with 
force; and reorientation, transitioning to another modus operandi.” 208 She finds that no 
group was defeated solely through repression.209 
While How Terrorism Ends uses the term “terrorism and counterterrorism,” many 
of the groups she analyzes operate as insurgent groups. For that reason I chose to analyze 
Yemen’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy using those six categories. 
While at the time of the writing the Huthis have signed a power sharing an agreement 
with the government, the Huthis are still fighting other non-state actors which is hardly a 
full success.210 Additionally, while AQAP has had setbacks, it unfortunately has not 
failed. 
a. Decapitation 
For this paper “decapitation” refers not to removing someone’s head, but to 
removing the top leaders of an organization through arrest or assassination.211 This does 
not include air strikes against mid-to-low level members of the Huthis or AQAP. Cronin 
finds that decapitation operations sometimes can spell the demise of a faltering group. 
Other times the action has little effect or strengthens the group. The results are 
inconsistent.212 The Republic of Yemen used decapitation as a strategy based on its 
historic actions but the results have been mixed.  
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The first incidence of the decapitation operation was in 2002 with the targeted 
assassination of al Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) leader al-Harithi. This decapitation operation 
proved to be successful—in the short term. The decapitation operation hastened the 
collapse of AQY. 213While AQY ceased to exist as an organization in Yemen, the al 
Qaeda ideology was not defeated and AQAP remains in Yemen today. 
The second occurrence of decapitation operation was the death of Husayn al-
Huthi, first leader of the Huthi movement. Originally the mission was to arrest the 
Believing Youth leader. A Yemeni air strike hit the cave that the Husayn al-Huthi and his 
family were hiding in. Husayn al-Huthi sent his wives and children out of the cave who 
were soon spotted by Yemen infantrymen. After a brief period of negotiation, Husayn al-
Huthi emerged from his hideout. He then allegedly reached into his jacket, possibly for a 
pistol he was carrying, and the soldiers opened fire and killed the Huthi leader. This 
decapitation operation managed to briefly pause fighting and create a Huthi martyr.214 
While the decapitation operations may have led to tactical advantages, or stopped 
specific terrorism operations, decapitation has done little strategically to end the conflicts 
in Yemen.215 Other targeted assassinations have killed top AQAP commanders such as 
Said al-Shihri, Anwar al-Awlaqi, and Fahd al-Quso. These deaths weakened AQAP 
momentarily, but have not defeated the organization.216 This is not entirely unexpected 
outcome. Cronin theorizes that decapitation operation strategy stems from mirror 
imaging. Government officials think eliminating the head of a hierarchical organization 
will weaken that organization. Additionally, officials find it nearly impossible to not 
attack the head of the group that threatens the public safety—people demand a response 
to violence.217 
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b. Negotiations 
The government can use negotiations with insurgent groups in order to transition 
them into legitimate political process. Cronin finds that negotiating with mature 
groups218 does not lengthen or shorten a campaign on average, but can hasten a declining 
group. Talks are also used to manage violence.219 This section limits the scope to 
strategic negotiations, not tactical level negotiations such as a field swap of prisoners or 
negotiating the end of a siege. The Yemeni government has used the strategy of 
negotiation with the Huthis with limited results. The Yemeni government has also 
negotiated with al Qaeda, achieving détente at times. 
The Huthis and the Republic of Yemen have a long and complicated negotiation 
history. The Huthis’ stated demands are more reasonable than al Qaeda’s goal of 
violently overthrowing the government and establishing an Islamic State.220 The Huthis 
demand the end of corruption and government abuses, enfranchisement, equal access to 
government funds, freedom of religion, equality, and rule of law.221 Salmoni, Loidolt, 
and Wells assert that the negotiations hurt the prospects for peace during the six round 
Sadah War because the talks built up mutual mistrust due to frequent break downs.222  
During the Sadah War (2004–2010) the Huthi family and the Yemeni government 
negotiated multiple times. Early on, between 2004 and 2006, half a dozen attempts for 
mediation between sides occurred. At first, the Huthis felt it had the upper hand so in 
June 2004, and again in July 2004, talks fell apart. Later Brig. General Ali Muhsin, acting 
independently, disrupted negotiations by attacking the Huthis. In 2005, Sadah saw a short 
ceasefire. Later in 2007, Qatar intervened and the Doha agreement was signed in 2008 
(see Chapter V Section D), but fighting continued despite this international mediation. 
Later in the conflict, President Saleh was more confident and often did not follow 
through on promises such as the release of prisoners. The lack of command and control 
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capabilities on the Huthi side is another reason the talks failed. The Huthis could not 
control its allies fighting in its name who would continue to fight during mediation.223 
In early 2010 a unilateral ceasefire was declared by the Huthis after several 
months of Saudi armed intervention. The Huthis accepted the Yemeni government’s 
conditions, provided the Saudi’s would stop attacking them. The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA) and the ROY soon followed the Huthis in declaring ceasefires.224 Qatar 
intervened again in August 2010 and negotiated an “explanatory index” to the original 
Doha agreement.225 This ceasefire proved more durable since confidence measures were 
undertaken. Yemen released a large number of Huthi prisoners.226 
After the Arab Spring, the Huthis were able to consolidate power in Sadah 
governorate while increasing its political power in the capital.227 The government 
included the Huthis in the UN-backed National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which gave 
them a legitimate national and international voice.228 In September 2014, after defeating 
its rivals and taking control of the capital the Huthis negotiated, from a position of 
strengthen, a power sharing agreement.229 It is too early to assess the power sharing 
agreement. The Doha agreements were not fully implemented but in this case the Huthis 
are more powerful than during the Sadah Wars, so the outcome may be different. 
The Yemeni government negotiated off and on with AQAP and its predecessor 
organizations. Novak notes that the Yemeni government and jihadists have enjoyed 
détente since the 1990s.230 Negotiation with al Qaeda directly began in 2002 with the so-
called “Dialog Program.” Jihadists that promised not to attack Yemeni targets would be 
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left alone by the government. The program let some al Qaeda members out of jail early 
so they could go and fight in Iraq or elsewhere.231 In 2005 and 2006, the head of the 
Political Security Organization (PSO) and former bin Laden associate Rashad 
Mohammed Saeed openly negotiated with al Qaeda promising money and cars for 
compliance with the “do not attack” agreement. Later Brig. General Ali Muhsin recruited 
jihadists to fight as mercenaries in the Sadah War.232 The détente broke down in 2007 
when seven elderly Spanish tourists were massacred at the Queen of Sheba’s temple.233 
c. Success or Failure 
Sometimes terrorist or insurgency campaigns end when groups achieve their 
objectives. Success is difficult to define since it is defined by the group itself.234 There 
are limited examples of this happening in Yemen; the closest example is the Islamic Jihad 
in Yemen (IJY). After the Yemeni government recruited IJY in the 1994 Civil War, the 
group dissolved and former members returned home or were rewarded with jobs in  
the military, security forces, or civil service.235 Success in this case assumes that its goal 
was jobs. The Huthis may be another example, if the power sharing agreement is 
implemented and the group lays down its arms.  
Failure is when a terrorist group disintegrates due to its own tactics. This can be 
observed as a backlash, implosion, or marginalization.236 Unfortunately neither AQAP 
nor the Huthis are close to failure. The Aden Abyan Islamic Army in Yemen is a good 
example of failure. The backlash against group for murdering tourists combined with 
repression lead to its demise.237 
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d. Repression 
This section will give a general overview of strategy and tactics used by the 
government to repress the Huthis and AQAP and their followers (and often others in the 
vicinity). Repression is the most instinctive reaction to violence from non-state 
organizations. Cronin defines repression as “the state’s use of overwhelming, 
indiscriminate, or disproportionate force...” 238 The Yemeni government used repression 
against both the Huthi and AQAP. The organization, resources, and implementation of 
the military will be covered in later in this chapter in Section C. 
An ideal counterinsurgency strategy is clear-and-hold. Clear-and-hold requires 
foot-mobile “soft entry” into villages followed by intelligence driven police-like 
operations. The Yemeni military lacks the equipment and training for such operations. 
The military is also constrained by the rugged geography of Yemen. During the Sadah 
War, based off of limited reporting, the Yemeni military generally used a strategy of 
blockade-and-bombard. This involves creating a cordon around a village or hide out to 
prevent escape then indiscriminate bombarding of the target area with artillery and air 
strikes.239 The Yemeni militaries poor counterinsurgency doctrine has led to high levels 
of civilian casualties. The Huthis claim 25,000 civilian casualties, although other 
organizations put the number much lower.240 The bombardment tactics caused many 
neutral or pro-government Yemenis to side with the Huthis after they were trapped in the 
bombardment zone or their property was damaged.241  
When fighting AQAP in the south the Yemeni military used similar blockade-
and-bombard tactics. The government either learned its lesson from fighting the Huthis or 
employed more enlightened commanders because the military attempted to evacuate the 
towns prior to military action.242 A key difference in the Sadah War and the AQAP 
insurgency is that the locals sided with the government against AQAP and Ansar al 
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Shariah (ASY).243 Locals formed “Popular Committees” (militias) that are dedicated to 
protecting their property and have extensive knowledge of the local terrain.244 
The government engaged in other forms of repression. The government used mass 
arrests and detention of suspected Huthis or former Believing Youth members. The 
military have historically arrested AQAP and Huthi member’s non-combatant relatives, 
including the elderly and young, and seized their family’s property as a punishment.245 
The ROY also briefly outlawed most aspects of the Zaydi sect. Between 2005 and 2008 
the government replaced Zaydi preachers with Salafi preachers in mosques across the 
country, prohibited celebrating the main Zaydi holiday al-Ghadir, and confiscated all 
Zaydi related texts.246 In addition to restricting the freedom of religion, the government 
restricts NGO and press access to the war zone. The Yemen government reported in 2008 
that it jailed 1200 political prisoners while the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs estimated 3000 political prisoners.247  
The government named the operation during the sixth round of the Sadah War 
“Operation Scorched Earth.”248 While it is not clear that the government actually 
engaged in actual scorched earth tactics, reports indicate that the government blockaded 
fuel and food shipments and cut communication lines into Sadah.249 Without fuel, 
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farmers cannot run generators that power water pumps. Crops normally sold in the rest of 
Yemen or Saudi Arabia were reportedly left to rot waiting for delivery. At the end of the 
sixth round of conflict in Sadah 300,000 residents were displaced, 9,000 structures 
destroyed, and 25,000 dead.250 According to Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells official 
government figures (after the fifth round) add “900 farms, 90 mosques, 80 schools, five 
health care facilities” destroyed or damaged in Sadah governorate.251 As of September 
2014 287,809 internally displaces persons (IDP) remained.252 
e. Reorientation 
Reorientation is simply defined by Cronin as “transitioning to another modus 
operandi.” Cronin explains this as turning to criminal behavior, such as organized crime, 
or to insurgency or civil war.253 I believe reorientation to a political party should be 
included here. That is often done through negotiations. The Huthi started out as a 
resistance movement254 and reoriented to insurgency,255 and AQAP started out as a 
terrorist group256 and reoriented towards insurgency. With the power sharing agreement 
signed between the Huthis and the government it is possible the Huthis will reorient to a 
political party. 
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2. Legislation 
Yemen has a weak legal frame work for fighting terrorism. Currently the legal 
system is a mix of shariah law, the Napoleonic code, English common law, and Yemeni 
customary law.257 As of 2014, the Republic of Yemen has no laws on the books to 
directly fight terrorism. An anti-terrorism law drafted in 2008 has not passed the Yemeni 
Parliament. In 2013, revisions were made to the 2008 draft law but the newer version has 
yet to be signed into law. If passed the law would help law enforcement detain suspects 
accused of terrorism and set a minimum mandatory sentencing for numerous terrorism 
related crimes.258 Currently, much to the expressed frustration of the Yemeni Ministry of 
Legal Affairs, terrorism suspects are charged with “membership in an armed gang.”259 
Suspects found guilty of the gang membership charge receive relatively light 
sentences.260 Suspects arrested for murder, destruction of property, or other crimes can be 
charged with those crimes.261 
Yemen participates in international anti-terrorism legal programs. ROY has the 
capability to screen people using biographic and biometric data through its participation 
in the U.S. State Department sponsored Terrorist Interdiction Program’s (TIP) Personal 
Identification Secure Comparison Evolution System (PISCES) at 26 points of entry. 
Widespread corruption undermines the efforts to stop terrorists from entering Yemen 
with TIP-PISCES. Yemen is also a member of the Middle East and North Africa 
Financial Action Task Force regional body. The task force noted as of 2013 Yemen had 
“strategic deficiencies” and had yet to fully criminalize money laundering or financing 
terrorism. 262  
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The overall assessment of the law enforcement and judicial system in Yemen is 
that it is of limited use against terrorists. The U.S. State Department assesses that the 
Yemeni “law enforcement units demonstrated limited capacity to detect, deter, or respond 
to terrorist incidents.” There is little interagency coordination or information sharing and 
the lack of the terrorism laws discourage law enforcement officials.263 The Yemeni 
military has the primary counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capability.264 
C. COUNTERINSURGENCY/COUNTERTERRORISM ORGANIZATION, 
RESOURCES AND MEASURES IN YEMEN 
Three aspects are examined in this section. The organizational framework of the 
Yemeni military and security services, focusing on units engaged in counterinsurgency 
and counterterrorism operations. Next, the resources of those units will be examined. 
Finally, the implication of the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy will be 
analyzed. 
1. Organizational Framework 
There are two phases to the organization framework of the military and security 
structure. The first phase dates to the start of the conflict, and can be described as a 
“coup-proof” military organization. The second phase started post-Arab Spring. The 
military and security services are currently being reorganized. President Hadi’s main goal 
of the reorganization is to consolidate power over the military and weaken former 
President Saleh loyalists—in other words he is creating a different “coup-proof” military 
structure.265 Neither structure is designed with Yemeni external security as the number 
one goal. The main purpose of the military is to defend the regime against internal 
threats.266 
The first phase of the military organizational framework was designed in what 
James T. Quinlivan calls “coup-proofing” which is characterized by “parallel military 
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organizations and multiple internal security agencies” (see Figure 1). The “parallel” units 
(Republican Guard and later the Strategic Reserve Forces) receive the best training and 
equipment. However, the practice is known to undermine overall effectiveness to the 
state’s military because of the multiple chains of command.267 In this section, I will 
highlight the units that have COIN/CT duties.  
 
 
Figure 1.  First Military Organizational Framework268 
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Yemen has three intelligence agencies. The first intelligence agency is the 
Political Security Organization (PSO), which reports directly to the president and is 
tasked with counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and general intelligence gathering. The 
PSO has the authority to make arrests and runs its own prison system. The PSO 
reportedly worked with the CIA to combat al Qaeda.269 The organization is said to 
employ former jihadists, likely from the Islamic Jihad of Yemen (IYJ).270 The PSO also 
worked with the FBI on the USS Cole bombing. The organization was led by Ghalib al-
Qamish, one of the few top commanders not related to President Saleh.271 In order to 
replace the jihadi staffed and corrupt PSO, President Saleh created the independent 
National Security Bureau (NSB) in 2002. The NSB’s role is to coordinate intelligence 
across the government and security forces and liaison with foreign intelligence services. 
The NSB was run by Ali al-Ansi and Colonel Ammar Saleh, the president’s nephew.272 
The final intelligence agency is the Ministry of Defense’s Military Intelligence (MI). MI 
is responsible for internal security and has the power to arrest and detain suspects.273  
The Republic of Yemen maintains two Special Forces units tasked with 
combating terrorists. First, in the Republican Guard was the Yemeni Special Operation 
Forces (YSOF) which reported directly to President Saleh. Previously lead by the 
president’s son Ahmad Saleh, the unit is tasked counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and 
anti-riot duties. The YSOF received training from U.S. Special Forces.274 Subordinate to 
the Ministry of the Interior was the Central Security Forces-Counter Terrorism Unit 
(CSF-CTU). Part of the larger gendarmerie Central Security Forces, the CSF-CTU, also 
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received U.S. CT training. Formally lead by the president’s nephew Yahya Saleh, the 
CTU-CSF is tasked according to IHS Jane’s with “hostage rescue, close-quarters combat, 
forced entry and operations against high-value targets.”275 The Ministry of Defense did 
not have any specific counterterrorism units. 
The military and security forces of the Ministry of the Defense and to a lesser 
extent the CSF and Republican Guard (RG) provided a majority of the forces for the 
counterinsurgency operations. The Ministry of Defense controlled “regular army” is 
charged with defending the country from outside invasion (although this is not likely with 
the improved relations with its neighbors) and counterinsurgency. The regular army has 
waged numerous campaigns against insurgents, jihadists, and tribal militias.276 The 
regular army was divided into five regional commands.277 The RG acted mainly as a 
praetorian guard with its members drawn from the president’s tribal confederation. The 
RG was commanded by the president’s son Ahmad Saleh.278 The final security force is 
the Ministry of the Interior’s Central Security Force (CSF). The CSF’s role is in internal 
order and security including running internal checkpoints and securing government 
buildings and essential infrastructure.279 
The second phase of the organizational framework started with the accession of 
President Hadi to the Presidency in February 2012. President Hadi worked to unify the 
divided command structure of the military while weakening military commanders viewed 
as not loyal (see Figure 2). This period is also known for a marked increased ability of the 
armed forces to confront AQAP. President Hadi removed former President Saleh’s son 
Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh as head of the Republican Guard and Yemeni Special 
Operations forces, removed former President Saleh’s nephew Yahya Saleh as head of the 
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Central Security Forces and Brig. General Ali Muhsin as head of the First Armored 
Division. In December 2012, he issued a decree restructuring the armed forces into five 
branches and abolishing the Republican Guard and First Armor Division.280  
 
 
Figure 2.  Second Military Organizational Framework281 
While the organizational framework changed, and most of Saleh’s relatives were 
removed, the roles of the individual organizations did not change. The intelligence 
                                                 
280 IHS Jane’s “Executive Summary: Yemen,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, last modified 
June 25, 2009, 2009. 
281 IHS Jane’s, “Yemen’s president restructures military,” December 21, 2012, 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=++
+1535110&Pubabbrev=JDW; Sharp, Yemen: Background (2012), 4–6; Soudias and Transfeld, “Mapping 
Popular Perceptions,” 18–9; Hull, High Value Target, 8–9, 35–6, 80; IHS Jane’s, “Yemen: Armed Forces,” 
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, last modified September, 17 2014 ; and work of author. 
 54
agencies did not change in the organizational framework.282 The Special Forces changed 
significantly, with the CSF-CTU and the YSOF moved into the new Special Forces 
Command in the Strategic Reserve Forces. The army increased the number of regional 
commands from five to seven. Other significant changes include dissolving the 
Republican Guard and folding its units into the Ministry of Defense or the new Strategic 
Reserve Forces.283 The Strategic Reserve Forces appears to continue the “coup-proofing” 
military tradition.  
2. COIN/CT Resources 
Yemen must deal with limited resources when conducting its counterinsurgency 
and counterterrorism operations. The army has a large number of personnel, but soldiers 
are often poorly trained and equipped. The army had to shift focus from conventional 
warfare to counterinsurgency warfare in the past decade but the military commanders 
continue to focus on heavy weapons better suited for conventional warfare. 
The Republic of Yemen has a relatively large standing military to deal with 
numerous internal threats. The army employs 60,000 active duty personal and 40,000 
reservists. An additional 200,000 “inactive” troops (also called “ghost soldiers”) exist. 
The “inactive troops” collect a salary but do not perform any duties. Ghost troops are a 
clear waste of money and resources. The Yemeni military also has 5000 airmen, 1700 
sailors, and 500 marines.284 The Yemeni military relies on conscription—but mainly as a 
way to counteract unemployment.285 The government, ranked eleven in the world in 
military spending of GDP, spends approximately 4 percent GDP on its military.286 
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The training and equipping of units is inconsistent. Front-line troops in the regular 
army are poorly trained and equipped.287 The elite units of the former RG, YSOF, and 
CSF-CTU received American training and equipment but are mainly used as a praetorian 
guard and are rarely used against the Huthis or Ansar al Shariah.288 The Americans have 
provided transport aircraft, four Huey and 10 Hip helicopters, 50 HMMWVs, radios, and 
night vision goggles. The equipment is designed to be used for counterterrorism raids by 
Special Forces.289 While there is known to be a ground forces training center, little 
information is available on military training outside the Special Forces.290 
Except for small numbers of advanced equipment reserved for counterterrorism 
operations against al Qaeda, the Yemeni military is equipped with a mix of aging Soviet, 
American, and French military equipment. The equipment is designed for conventional 
warfare. There are reportedly no plans to modernize current equipment, but the 
government is said to be interested procuring additional T-72 main battle tanks.291 
3. COIN/CT Implementation 
The implementation of successful counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 
strategy has been hindered by several factors. First, poor counterinsurgency doctrine 
causes destruction while doing little to win control over territory contested by the Huthis 
of AQAP. Second, the government can only achieve low levels of joint service 
interoperability. Finally, elite power struggles hampers the military’s full capabilities. 
As noted earlier, the Yemeni military uses a poorly developed counterinsurgency 
doctrine. The strategy of blockade-and-bombard, which involves creating a cordon 
around a village to prevent escape then indiscriminate bombarding of the target, leads to 
high levels of civilian casualties.292 An outer cordon often included much of Sadah 
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Governorate, with food and fuel shipments stopped from reaching the greater population. 
293 The strategy dates back to at least the 1994 civil war when it was used by the northern 
forces294 suggesting little has evolved in military thought and shows how the military is 
neither flexible nor innovative. The battles won against the Huthis and AQAP were due 
to the militants withdrawing rather than through infantry operations.295 The military 
during the Sadah Wars reportedly also used small unit engagements.296  
The Yemeni military has achieved low levels of joint interoperability. During the 
Sadah Wars the Yemeni Air Force conducted limited offensive air operations against 
Huthi positions, although strikes were not coordinated with the army. During the Abyan 
battle, the air force conducted similar air strikes and the navy reportedly conducted 
limited naval artillery operations on AQAP positions.297 
During the Huthi conflict, the Yemeni military deployed its conventional forces 
including infantry, armor, artillery, and support engineer units. The elite Republican 
Guard and Yemeni YSOF were reported engage in missions to capture or kill high value 
targets but were normally retained for purposes of regime security in Sanaa. The army 
was led by Brig. General Ali Muhsin and Yemeni’s often call the Sadah War “Ali 
Muhsin’s War.” The regular army was made up of mostly Sunni conscripts from the 
south and anti-Huthi officers from Sadah governorate.298 Ali Muhsin often relied on slow 
moving tanks and armored personnel carriers in the Sadah War which were vulnerable to 
RPGs and IEDs. Despite the use of heavy weapons and air power, the Yemen military 
were unable to defeat the lightly armed Huthis.299 
The government’s efforts to secure Sadah governorate were undermined by elite 
struggles within the regime. The dispute was between Brig. General Ali Muhsin, the main 
                                                 
293 Boucek, “War in Saada,” 47. 
294 IHS Jane’s, “Yemen: Armed Forces.” (2014).  
295 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 164–5; IHS Jane’s.”World Armies: Yemen,” 
(2014). 
296 IHS Jane’s, “Yemen: Armed Forces.” (2014).  
297 IHS Jane’s, “Yemen: Armed Forces.” (2014). 
298Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 159–60, 167.  
299 IHS Jane’s.”World Armies: Yemen,”(2014). 
 57
Yemeni commander during the Sadah wars, and Ahmed Ali Saleh, the commander of the 
Republican Guard and YSOF.300 The cause of the dispute was over the possible 
succession of Ahmed Ali to the office of President. During the Sadah War, Ali Muhsin 
requested the full backing of the RG and CSF but President Saleh reportedly refused.301 
The dispute reached new heights when military planners in Sanaa working with the Saudi 
Air Force in 2009 gave a list of proposed air strike targets that included Ali Muhsin’s 
headquarters.302 President Saleh also reportedly withheld new equipment from the troops 
fighting in the Sadah, instead procuring new Russian equipment for the Republican 
Guard.303  
In the war against AQAP/ASY in Abyan, which occurred during the backdrop of 
the Arab Spring, the effort was stalled due to the political situation. After seizing the 
town of Jaar, hundreds al Qaeda militants attacked the Abyan governorate capital of 
Zinjibar. After over running the CSF garrison, AQAP tried to take the 25 Mechanized 
Brigade but were held off by the regular army troops and the CSF policemen that 
managed to regroup at the base. The base commander General Sumali called for backup. 
At this point in time, Ali Muhsin had defected and the military was split between pro-
Saleh and pro-Muhsin factions. General Sumali took a neutral or “pro-Yemen” stance 
neither the Republican Guard nor the Muhsin-loyal 119 Brigade would assist him.304 It 
was only after the President Hadi took over that a coordinated counter-offense was able 
to drive AQAP from the battlefield.305 
The Yemeni government has also employed tribal militiamen in both conflicts. 
During the Huthi Wars the government employed thousands of Sunni tribesmen from 
outside Sadah to fight the Huthis. Brig. General Ali Muhsin is reported to have recruited 
Islah (Muslim Brotherhood) fighters and Salafi extremists from the south to battle the 
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Huthis.306 In the fight in the Abyan against AQAP, the government equipped and funded 
local “Popular Committees.” Unlike in the Sadah War most of these militias are 
defending their home towns from AQAP.307 The use of tribes has precedent with tribal 
militias fighting in the 1962 and 1994 civil wars. Working with of tribal militias has the 
added benefit for the government of dividing and weakening the tribes.308 A drawback to 
outsourcing the state security is that these Popular Committees could turn on the 
government or side with another militant group. 
D. PUBLIC SUPPORT IN YEMEN 
Analysis of public support for the Yemeni government reveals low levels of 
support. This was fairly evident by the Arab Spring. The political situation is chaotic with 
multiple factions fighting for control, which can undermine the public’s faith in the 
government. The economy and social situation is equally as bad with the middle class 
shrinking and poverty rising and rising levels of corruption. Limited public polling 
reveals significant levels of perceived insecurity across Yemen.  
1. Political Situation in Yemen 
The Political situation in Yemen is best described as unstable and chaotic. The 
central government has to compete with the tribes, political parties, independently 
minded regional military leaders, Islamists, the Huthis, and Hirak for the Weberian 
monopoly of violence.309 IHS Jane’s asserts that Yemen relies heavily on “patronage, 
coercion, and propaganda” to rule.310 In addition to the Huthi and AQAP insurgencies, 
the Arab Spring also changed the political situation in Yemen. The Arab Spring in 
Yemen started in early 2011 and ended with President Saleh resigning in return for 
immunity from prosecution. Saleh signed a CCG brokered deal on November 23rd. Soon 
thereafter, Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi was then “elected” in a one 
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candidate election. President Hadi purged the government of Saleh’s family after taking 
office.311  
Following President Hadi’s election, the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) 
was held to form a new government. The NDC brought together representatives from 
various political parties and groups, but is moving much slower than planed with only an 
agreement on federation signed. The NDC still needs to write a new constitution hold a 
referendum on the constitution, and hold presidential and parliamentary elections—all of 
which should have happened by February 2014.312  
The Huthis complicated matters when its forces and allies seized control of the 
capital and forced President Hadi to sign a power sharing agreement in late 2014.313 It is 
too early to assess the results of the Huthi “victory” and power sharing. Emerging reports 
are linking the sudden victory to a secret alliance with former President Saleh. The Huthi 
ranks were reportedly swelled with laid off former Republican Guards.314 
The constant political upheaval caused by the Sadah wars, the AQAP-led 
insurgencies, the Arab Spring, internal political power plays, the slowness of the NDC 
process and finally the Huthi takeover undoubtedly undermine public confidence in the 
government. While it appears the wars with the Huthis are over for now, fighting AQAP 
and Ansar al Shariah will probably have some support since these groups are viewed as 
less legitimate than the government. 
2. Economic and Social Situation 
The economic and social situation of a country contributes to the general 
satisfaction of the people and affects their support for the government and its policies. 
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The economic and social situation in Yemen is poor. IHS Jane’s assesses that the 
“combination of economic and social factors exacerbated by perceptions of corruption”  
is the main cause of Yemen’s problems.315 This was evident during the Arab Spring 
protests. This section will provide a concise overview of economic and social situation in 
Yemen. 
Yemen has two major industries, oil and qat—both are part of the same negative 
feedback loop. Oil makes up 60 percent of the state’s revenue but at the current level of 
production oil reserves will be exhausted in 10 to 15 years. Oil accounts for 87 percent of 
exports making it the main source of foreign currency.316 In 2006, the ROY started an 
economic program to diversify the economy.317 The revenue generated by oil pays for 
fuel subsidies which accounts for around 11 percent of GDP. The low fuel prices in turn 
make the cost of pumping water artificially low and the cheap water is then used to grow 
qat. The mild narcotic qat is Yemen’s main cash crop. Cultivation of qat employs  
12 percent of the Yemeni population and uses 40 percent of the countries water supply. 
Qat hurts productivity with workers spending upwards of one quarter of the work day on 
qat breaks. The average Yemeni spends between 10 percent and 30 percent of their 
annual income on the drug.318 
Yemen’s economic and resource long-term structural economic problems might 
eclipse its current problems with the Huthis and AQAP.319 First, attacks on the oil 
infrastructure could lead to sudden drops in government revenue, a possible a balance-of-
payment crisis and difficulties in paying government salaries on time. Second, long term 
declines on oil revenue would result in the same problems—and fixing a pipeline will not 
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be the quick fix.320 Without oil the already high unemployment will rise due to the 
layoffs from the large public sector.321 
The overall economic situation for the average Yemeni is also poor. The official 
unemployment rate is 33.7 percent and the GDP per capita (PPP) is estimated at $2,500. 
Over 45 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Inflation was close to  
12 percent in 2013.322 The Yemeni middle class has shrunk since the early 2000s and 
hunger and malnutrition are on the rise.323 The population growth rate is very high at 
2.72 percent (world rank 20th).324 The worsening economic situation undermines people 
confidence in the government.  
Corruption is also a major problem in Yemen, with Terrill describing the system 
as a “kleptocracy.” The low pay of the large government and military workforce leads to 
civil servants, police, and soldiers to take small bribes from the populace to do their job. 
The system extends up the chain of command.325 In 2013, Yemen came in 167 out of  
175 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index suggesting the population perceives 
widespread corruption across the government.326 
With the loss of oil revenue, shrinking middle class, and increasing 
unemployment and poverty it will be difficult for the Yemeni government to rally public 
support for (or even pay for) its COIN/CT policies. This is compounded with the 
perception of widespread corruption. Some of these issues were manifested in the Arab 
Spring and the Sadah War. 
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3. Analysis of Public Opinion 
Public Opinion data in Yemen is scarce. The Yemen Polling Center (YPC), a 
local institute that has partnered with Gallop, the United Nations, and the World Bank, 
released data in July 2014 detailing the popular perceptions of security and insecurity in 
Yemen.327 A significantly less detailed report was published in 2012 and 2013, making a 
trend analysis of the conflict time frame (2004–2014) impossible.328 Yet the 2013 and 
2014 poll still provides insight in security and insecurity in Yemen. While not a measure 
of public support for COIN/CT policies per se, no governorate views the Yemeni 
government as the number one source of insecurity. The highest percentages of citizens 
viewing the government as the number one source of insecurity are in Sadah (20 percent), 
Hadramawt (15 percent) and Marib (11 percent). It is not clear whether the citizens are 
citing the government based on the government’s actions or inactions. Yemenis view 
other groups as more serious problems. AQAP/ASY and other “extremists” are viewed as 
the number one source of insecurity in al-Jawf (35 percent), Marib (25 percent), Shabwa 
(20 percent), al Baydha (25 percent), Abyan (52 percent), Lahj (33 percent), and 
Hadramawt (25 percent). Huthis are viewed as the main source of insecurity in Sadah (24 
percent), Hajja (25 percent), and Sanaa (18 percent). Tribal conflicts are of the greatest 
concern in Rayma (16 percent) and Dhamar (15 percent). Finally crime is the number one 
source of insecurity in Amran (20 percent), Aden (34 percent), al Dhali (20 percent), Taiz 
(18 percent), Ibb (24 percent), and Sanaa City (36 percent). The data is not available for a 
conclusive assessment but logic dictates that higher levels of insecurity could translate 
into higher tolerance of government actions against AQAP/AY and the Huthis.329 
                                                 
327 Soudias and Transfeld, “Mapping Popular Perceptions,” 
http://yemenpolling.org/advocacy/publications.  
328 Yemen Polling Center, “The State of Security in Yemen: Great Challenges and Inherent 
Weaknesses,” March 2012, http://yemenpolling.org/advocacy/publications.; Yemen Polling Center, “Public 
Perceptions of the Security Sector and Police Work in Yemen,” January, 2013, 
http://yemenpolling.org/advocacy/publications. 
329 Soudias and Transfeld, “Mapping Popular Perceptions.” 
 63
E. CONCLUSION/ANALYSIS 
The Republic of Yemen executes its counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 
polities within the military paradigm. This is due to the weak legal frame work and 
limited policing ability. The main strategy used by the Yemeni government is repression 
with limited decapitation operations and negotiations. The Yemeni military is not capable 
on its own to use repression to end the two insurgencies. First, the military is designed in 
a “coup-proofing” structure, which limits the use of the best trained and best equipped 
units as a praetorian guard. Second, the military is still equipped to fight a conventional 
war and has yet to adapt to the realities of asymmetrical warfare. Third, the 
counterinsurgency strategy, block-and-bombard, hurts the government’s popular support. 
Finally, political elite infighting has undermined the military’s ability to effectively fight 
AQAP or the Huthis. The only bright side to the public support for counterinsurgency 
policies is the government’s use of Popular Committees against AQAP. This is a clear 
example of winning the popular support of the people against a common enemy, but at 
the same time it shows the weakness of the government. Unless the government makes 
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IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF INSURGENCIES 
“The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the 
sea…It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies 
and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.” 
—Mao Tse-tung 330 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Huthis have waged a more effective insurgency than al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula/Ansar al Shariah (AQAP/ASY) when measured by the standard of controlling 
territory. The Huthis control parts of northwest Yemen while AQAP’s control has been 
limited and sporadic. For the purposes for this chapter, I will limit the time frame of the 
study to the start of the respective insurgencies. The Huthis became an insurgent group in 
2004 and AQAP/ASY became an insurgent group in 2010.331 In this chapter, I will 
compare five variables. First, the strategies and development of the Huthis and AQAP 
since the outbreak of their respected conflicts will be compared. The second variable is 
the organizational structure and resources of the groups. Third, the recruitment strategies 
and popular support of the organizations will be compared. International support for the 
Huthis and AQAP, an important factor in successful insurgencies, is the fourth 
variable.332 Finally, a survey of territorial gains and losses over time will be compared. 
B. HUTHI MOVEMENT 
The Huthi movement has several factors that differentiate them from al Qaeda. 
First, the Huthis have developed from a peaceful social movement, to a resistance group, 
to an insurgency over the course of two decades. Second, the organizational structure 
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more closely resembles a Yemeni tribal confederation than an insurgent group. Third, the 
base of the Huthis is much larger and more diverse. Finally, the Huthis are more 
successful at capturing and administrating territory. 
1. Strategies and Developments 
The strategies and developments of the Huthi movement can be broken into five 
phases. The first phase was the Believing Youth era which was a religious revivalist 
social movement. During the second phase the Believing Youth became a political 
movement that protested Yemen’s participation in the GWOT. The first two phases were 
covered in Chapter II and will not be further covered here. The third phase saw the Huthi 
movement arise as militia whose professed goals were resistance against government 
repression and Salafist proselytizing. Phase four started during the Arab Spring. The 
Huthis formed a political wing and consolidated territorial gains in Sadah and its 
environs. The final phase, which recently began, saw the Huthis seize Sanaa, the capital 
of Yemen, and force President Hadi to sign a power sharing agreement. This section will 
focus on strategies during the third and fourth phases of development. The fifth phase is 
ongoing and it too early to tell if these gains will last. 
The third phase of development started when the first round of the Huthi war 
commenced. After anti-American and anti-government protests in Sanaa resulted in 
clashes with Yemeni security forces and the arrests of 600 members of the BY, the 
Huthis changed strategies and took up arms in defense. During the first round (June 
2004–September 2004), the government tried to arrest the BY leader Husayn al-Huthi but 
he died in a gun fight. The Republic of Yemen (ROY) declared an end to the conflict that 
had killed 1,000 in Sadah shortly after Husayn’s death.333 Between September 2004 and 
March 2005, Badr al-din al-Huthi (Husayn’s father) tried to negotiate an end to the 
conflict but the government officials refused to meet with him.334 Fresh fighting kicked 
off the second round (March 2005–April 2005), which was more widespread with combat 
in Sadah city. The government once again declared a unilateral cease fire after it thought 
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it killed Abdullah al-Razzami, a Huthi commander.335 During the second interim, low 
levels of violence continued and government arrested suspected Huthi supporters. 
Conflicts between Huthis and non-allied tribes continued during this time.336 The third 
round (December 2005–February 2006), saw an increase in violence. The round started 
when Huthis attacked a government checkpoint after a marked increase of pro-Huthi and 
pro-government tribal fighting. As punishment, the government used artillery and air 
strikes against villages suspected of hiding Huthi fighters. The elderly Badr al-din al-
Huthi died and was replaced by his son Abdul Malik al-Huthi as leader of the Huthis. 
Non-Huthi allied tribes started requesting government forces leave their land during this 
round. Fighting stopped for the 2006 presidential election.337 Negotiations between the 
Huthis and government started in February 2006, although low level tribal conflict 
continued.338  
The conflict significantly increased in intensity in the final three rounds. After a 
year-long lull, the fourth round began in February 2007. The government and a large 
number of pro-government tribal militias attacked Huthi positions in an unrestrained 
matter. The Huthis were on the defensive for most of the round, but managed to secure a 
base of operations in mountains and laid siege to a military unit trapped on a mountain. 
The Huthis were also able to secure more tribal allies alienated by ROY’s brutal COIN 
policies. Ultimately, the Huthis won the fourth round which ended in January 2008 with 
the Qatari mediated ceasefire.339 The ceasefire collapsed after a bomb detonated outside a 
mosque in Sadah city killed 17 and wounded 48 in May 2008. The mosque served both 
Zaydis and Sunnis340 so it is unclear who set off the bomb. During the fifth round, Huthi 
fighters pushed south to the outskirts of Sanaa city. The round ended in July 2008 after a 
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unilateral ceasefire was declared by President Saleh.341 The final round dubbed 
Operation Scorched Earth (August 2009–February 2010), was the last major round of the 
conflict. President Saleh blamed the Huthis for a kidnapping and the killing of Europeans 
in July. The Huthis blamed pro-government tribes for the killings, and staged large 
protests condemning the kidnapping.342 This round saw the formalization of Popular 
Committees and vast destruction of villages across Sadah and northern Amran 
governorates due to government bombardment. The Huthis gained numerous new 
followers and allies due to indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas. The final round 
also drew Saudi Arabian involvement along the border after the Huthis seized and later 
abandoned portions of Saudi territory. Saudi artillery and airplanes struck numerous 
Huthi targets in Sadah. Shortly after the failed Christmas 2009 underwear bombing of an 
aircraft by AQAP, Adb al Malik al-Huthi announced a ceasefire, accepting the ROY’s 
and Saudi conditions. The final round ended with vast damage across Sadah governorate 
and the Huthis in control of several districts.343  
During the six rounds of conflict, the Huthis’ strategy was mostly defensive. The 
only show of initiative was the push towards the capital during the fifth round and the 
strategically ill-advised campaign into Saudi Arabia in the sixth round. The tactics 
included standard guerilla operations such as: harassing fire on camps, checkpoints, and 
convoys; skirmishes; primitive IED attacks against convoys; assassinating top 
government and pro-government tribal officials; establishing checkpoints; destroying 
local government building; closing or destroying roads; raiding outposts and convoys for 
weapons.344 
The next phase of development occurred during the Arab spring, starting in 
February 2012, when the Huthis implemented a dual strategy of participating in the anti-
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government protests while securing control in Sadah governorate.345 On the military side 
the Huthis were able to consolidate control (with allied tribes) of most of Sadah after 
northwest regional commander Brig. General Ali Muhsin and 10,000 troops defected to 
the anti-President Saleh camp346 (see Figure 3). According to Terrill, the Huthis “ran 
checkpoints, secured roads, collected taxes oversaw local government administration and 
administered justice.”347  
 
Figure 3.  Map of Huthi Control as of October 2014.348 
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At the start of the Arab Spring, the Huthis were forced to articulate a clear 
political platform.349 The Arab Spring saw the political goals of three groups overlap, the 
Huthis, the Hirak, and the Revolutionary Youth.350 The Arab Spring recruits to the Huthi 
cause were young, urban, and educated. This urban Huthi base allied with the Hirak and 
Revolutionary Youth in opposition to the CCG transition plan.351 This new liberal base 
advocated “Huthi positions” at the UN-backed National Dialogue Conference (NDC), 
which also gave them a legitimate national and international voice.352 These Huthis 
advocated for federal democratic government with checks and balances, political 
pluralism, and freedom of religion. Yemeni critics charge that the Huthis are repressive in 
areas under its control and do not live up to its so-called ideals.353 
The final phase of development started in late 2014. With government presence in 
the north limited, the Huthis started clashing with anti-Huthi forces. The clashes started 
because the Huthis alleged that the al Qaeda-linked354 Salafist Dammaj Institute near 
Sadah was training foreign fighters. This lead to a complex conflict with the Huthis and 
its tribal allies and newly allied members of former President Saleh’s General People’s 
Congress (GPC) against Salafist fighters and AQAP, and an allied bloc of Salafists, the 
Ahmar family, Islah, and Brig. General Ali Muhsin and his 301th Military Brigade. 
Fighting raged across Sadah and into Amran, Hajja and al Jawf governorates, and along 
the Saudi border. In July, the Yemeni Air Force started bombing Huthi positions.355 The 
Huthis and its allies won victory after victory, gaining popular support through 
implementing security and law and order in areas under its control. The anti-Huthi 
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alliance lost the support of the Saudis due to links with the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
likely hastened their defeat.356  
As of the time of the writing of this paper the Huthis appeared to have “won” (at 
least momentary). While fighting raged to the north of Sanaa, Huthi led protests were 
held in the capital to protest fuel subsidies being lifted and to call for the government to 
resign.357 Protests lasted from July until late September.358 Brig. General Ali Muhsin’s 
soldiers and armed supporters of the Islah political party eventually confronted the 
protestors. Huthi fighters responded to attack, defeated both groups, then captured Ali 
Muhsin’s 1st Armored Division headquarters and Islah leader Sheikh Abdel-Majeed al-
Zindani’s359 al-Imam University. Large numbers of security forces switched sides and 
fought with the Huthis against the Ali Muhsin-Islah alliance. After crushing all its 
opponents the Huthis forced President Hadi to sign a power sharing agreement to make 
the Huthis part of the government. The Huthis included the Hirak in the spoils, as it is 
also a signatory.360  
2. Organization and Resources 
Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells describe the Huthi organization as an “organism.”361 
The group is organized as a network with different groups with relations to the center. It 
should be noted that information about the structure is scarce and dated. The highest 
command and control of the organization falls under the control of the al Huthi family 
(hence the “Huthi” name). IHS Jane’s describes the command and control as run along 
tribal and familial lines.362 The Huthi family is both a tribal and sada family which 
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increases the size of the organic network.363 In sum, the Huthis are organized into small 
local units across Yemen based on family, tribal, and, sada relationships (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4.  Theoretical Huthi Organizational Structure 
The Huthis did not have a paramilitary command, control, and communications 
structure in place prior to the initiation of the conflict. Since the conflict started, two 
levels of Huthi militia have developed. At the highest level the brothers of the Huthi 
family share various “headquarters” duties including head commander of Huthi forces. 
The Huthi family commands at least three small companies. The followers in these units 
are loyal to the Huthis due to familial or sada prestige. These groups are known to move 
within small areas of operations.364 The second source of fighters operates in platoon 
sized groups under the command of a local field commander. These groups are tied to a  
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local area, a town or district. Their mission is to primarily protect their homes from the 
military and pro-government militias. The semi-autonomous field commanders are local 
notables that are loyal to the Huthi family or Zaydi cause. Unlike AQAP’s leaders, the 
field commander’s authority over his followers is based on prestige rather than coercion. 
Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells note the heterogeneous makeup of the field commanders and 
the Huthi organization resembles a tribal confederation network structure rather than a 
paramilitary structure.365 While the Huthi military structure violates the highly organized 
guerrilla army laid out by Mao,366 the social-based network has proven to be a successful 
in northern Yemen’s society. 
The third source of armed supporters includes tribal militias allied with the 
Huthis, but not under direct Huthi control. In past rounds of fighting Huthi-allied tribes 
tried to settle old scores with pro-government tribes.367 The use of tribal allies has 
drawbacks (for both sides) as evident when the third round the conflict between the ROY 
and the Huthis started when Huthi-allied tribes and pro-government tribes started 
clashing.368 
In addition to the heterogeneous nature of the Huthis, the lack of effective 
communication or coordination also limited further centralization of the loosely formed 
Huthi organization. Several reports indicate the Huthi commanders and field commanders 
communicate via cell phones and satellite phones. Despite the communication 
capabilities the Huthis forces did not show the ability to coordinate attacks amongst the 
regional units.369 
The Huthis raise funds through two primary channels, taxation and smuggling. 
There is little proof to back ROY claims of international funding (see Section B.4). 
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According to IHS Jane’s, most funds are probably raised from smuggling qat into Saudi 
Arabia.370 The Huthis also collect a zakat in areas it controls.371 
Weapons are plentiful in northern Yemen and are part of an overall gun culture 
that emphasizes personal autonomy and manliness.372 The Yemeni government estimates 
two to three weapons per male aged 16–44. The Huthis also have access to the country’s 
largest arms market Suq al-Talh, where rifles, RPGs, and rockets are reportedly 
available.373 The Huthis also buy weapons from government conscripts who claim to 
have lost them during battles. Other sources included weapons donated to the cause and 
captured ROY weapons. Propaganda photographs show a captured T-55 tank, M113 
armored personal carrier (APC), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), trucks with mounted 
weapons (technicals), and a RATEL infantry fighting vehicle (IFV).374 
The organic command and control, coupled with local members dedicated to 
protecting their land and homes, and a large surplus of weapons have given the Huthis an 
edge in its contest with the government. The command and control would have to change 
if the Huthis are intent on expanding outside its traditional areas of operations and into 
Sunni populated areas, since the expansion would not be “defensive” and local recruits to 
the cause would be limited.  
3. Recruitment and Popular Support 
As stated earlier, the main recruiting efforts for the BY were religious education, 
youth study groups, and holiday gatherings (see Chapter II.3.B). After the conflict 
started, the efforts shifted from recruitment into a religious revival movement into a 
militia, which requires a significantly more dedicated member.375 There are three levels 
of supporters: fighters, direct supporters, and sympathizers (popular supporters). Due to 
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the media blackout in the conflict zone and the lack of reliable information376 it is 
difficult to judge the exact number of the supporters but a general analysis of the 
available information revels that the Huthis have a fairly high level of support in Sadah 
governorate, and more recently Amran and Sanaa governorates.  
Membership surged to the militant wing of the Huthis after fighting commenced 
in 2004. The number of fighters is difficult to judge but IHS Jane’s estimates the size of 
the fighting force to be around 6,000. Many reportedly joined out of anger at government 
bombardment of civilian areas during battles and the looting of property by pro-
government tribal militias during military operations.377 One Yemeni parliamentarian 
observed that the Huthis got stronger after each round as more people joined to defend 
their villages. A member of the ruling GPC party claimed that most Huthis joined for 
nonreligious reasons.378 
Both the Huthis and the ROY have tried to court tribal sheikhs. At the start of the 
conflict most supported the government but heavy-handed ROY military operations have 
driven some into the Huthi camp.379 The Huthis also act as neutral arbitrators in tribal 
and local disputes to win trust.380 But as Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells finds, “tribal 
alliances with the [government]—or Huthis—are short-lived, changing with 
circumstances or qabili [(tribal)] assessments of what benefits them at any given 
time.”381 The various tribal militias only cooperate when their interests overlap with the 
Huthis.382  
Popular support is difficult to measure without polling. The poor conduct of the 
Yemeni military in counterinsurgency operations, including indiscriminate bombardment 
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of civilian areas, and the general socioeconomic marginalization of northwest Yemen has 
garnered some popular support for the group.383 At least 3,000 people in Yemen have 
been arrested for supporting the Huthis.384 Videotaped organized holiday events, where 
Huthi ideologues give speeches, revel that thousands travel to remote areas to listen to 
Huthi speakers.385 The videos suggest a large support base in Sadah governorate. 
Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells assert that the Huthis attract three types of supporters. First, 
the religiously inclined are attracted to the pro-Zaydi message. The second group, with a 
more tribal outlook, is attracted to the group because they want to defend their homeland 
from the ROY military. Finally, a politically motivated group is drawn to the pro-
republican nature of the Huthis.386 During the “Arab Spring” the Huthis were able to 
attract new supporters from the young, educated, urban class.387 The Huthis made up 
approximately ten percent of the protestors in Sanaa’s change square.388 
Polling data on Yemen is limited. The Yemen Polling Center (YPC), a local 
institute that has partnered with Gallop, the United Nations, and the World Bank, released 
data in July 2014 detailing the popular perceptions of security and insecurity in 
Yemen.389 A significantly less detailed report was published in 2012 and 2013, making a 
trend analysis of the conflict time frame (2004–2014) impossible.390 Yet the 2013 and 
2014 poll still provides insight in popular support or lack thereof of the Huthis. First, 
while controlling the entire Sadah governorate since 2011, the Huthis are perceived as the 
top source of security problems by the populace in Sadah. Only 14 percent of the locals 
perceive Huthis as providing security as opposed to tribes (28 percent) or local notables 
or citizens (39 percent), suggesting the “control” of Sadah maybe not be as strong as 
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previously believed. The government is cited by no citizens as a provider of security. It is 
also possible that the tribes and local notables are allied or are working with the Huthis. 
While popular support cannot be determined from the poll it can be inferred that the  
28 percent of the population that named the Huthis as the primary source of insecurity are 
not loyal to the organization. Another 16 percent blame the government for Sadah’s 
insecurity but they could be loyal to anyone, including the government, which is not 
present in Sadah. Polling also shows that the Huthis provided some security in al-Jawf 
and Marib governorate.391  
The tribal and sectarian nature of the Huthis limits mass popular support in 
Yemen.392 As the Huthis expand control out of traditional Zaydi areas, it will likely face 
resistance from the local tribal populations. There have been reported clashes between 
Huthis and tribes after the Huthis tried to operate in tribal areas not allied with the 
Huthis.393 Since the conflict with the government broke out 2004, the Huthi’s greatest 
limitation in drawing in mass support is its current lack of social welfare wing common 
in other insurgent groups. This deficiency is probably due to lack of funding.394  
4. International Support 
The Yemeni government alleges that a variety of outside actors support the Huthi 
rebels. The government has listed Iran, Hezbollah, (Gaddafi’s) Libya, Iraq, and Eritrea as 
sources of international support.395 The major source of international support is Iran. An 
unnamed U.S. official alleged that Quds Force operatives396 were smuggling small and 
medium sized arms and explosives into Yemen via small boats through the Red Sea 
coast. Shortly afterward the U.S.-trained Yemeni Coast Guard interdicted a boat 
smuggling arms including antiaircraft missiles.397 While the Huthis and Iran have always 
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denied any ties,398 Iran provides political, in addition to material support, to the 
Huthis.399 In 2009, Iranian’s foreign minister and speaker of the parliament both declared 
that Iran is activity involved in Yemen’s “internal security.”400 No evidence of any other 
type of support by any other country has been provided by the Yemeni government. 
Policy analysts believe that the claims of outside assistance are exaggerated, intended to 
increase aid from the Gulf States. 401  
Overall, international support for the Huthis appears to be low. With the exception 
of probable regular weapons shipments from Iran the Huthis receive little else.402 Byman 
lists five sources of assistance that outside states can offer including, arms and money, a 
safe haven, diplomatic and political assistance, and direct military support.403 There are 
no reports of Iranian direct military support. The distance from Yemen to Iran limits the 
utility of a safe haven. Even if Huthis could travel to Iran for training, the Huthis have 
thousands of battle-hardened veterans—the group hardly need basic guerrilla training. It 
would be more helpful if Quds Force agents traveled to Yemen to provide specialized 
training. It is also clear that Iran does not provide much monetary assistance as evident by 
the Huthis lack of a strong social welfare wing.404 The diplomatic and political assistance 
are also limited, because Iran’s international relations with Europe, North Africa, and 
South-West Asia, and North America are strained.405 According to Clark, Iran did name 
a street “The Martyrs of Sadah Street,” but this does little to help the Huthi cause.406 
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Iran’s ties are also limited by the differences in Shia religious practices since the Huthis 
are wary of conversion efforts.407 
5. Territorial Gains and Losses 
The Huthis control large swaths of northwest and central Yemen as of October 
2014. During the six rounds of the Huthi conflict, the Huthis did not secure control over 
territory (liberated zones) until the fourth round.408 By the end of the sixth round, the 
Huthis were in control of several districts in Sadah.409 The weakening of state during the 
Arab Spring allowed the Huthis to cement control over the rest of Sadah.410 The Huthis 
were able to reach an agreement with non-Huthi notables in Sadah who collectively 
choose the non-Huthi Faris Man’a as governor of Sadah. The governorate is reportedly 
the most stable it has been in a decade.411 In late 2014 the Huthis took advantage of a 
weak government and hostile (yet weak) opposition to take control of most of northwest 
Yemen.412 At the time of the writing the Huthis are still on the offensive. The Huthis 
claim these gains are locally driven, with locals allying themselves with the Huthis—but 
pushes into Sunni areas raise doubts on this narrative.413  
C. AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 
We bring to our nation the good news that the mujahedeen passed the 
stage of defense and repulsion of the aggression to the stage where they 
can take the initiative and attack.  
—Hamil al-Misk in The Echo of Epic Battles414  
Despite also operating in Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is 
quite different than the Huthis. First, the AQAP, descended from a line of Jihadi-Salafists 
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dedicated to violence and terrorism. They only later developed from a terrorist group to 
an insurgent group—that engages in terrorism. Second, the organizational structure of 
AQAP is what the Council on Foreign Relations calls “heretical, compartmentalized, and 
decentralized.”415 Third, the base of the AQAP is much smaller, since Salafists make up 
only a small minority in Yemen. AQAP relies more heavily on foreign fighters because 
of this and there international agenda. Finally, al Qaeda is far less successful than the 
Huthis in controlling territory. 
1. Strategies and Developments 
The strategies and developments of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
can be broken into two phases. The first phase, which started with the creation of al 
Qaeda in the South Arabian Peninsula after the 2006 prison break, was characterized by 
terrorist attacks designed to undermine the legitimacy of the Yemeni government.416 This 
differs significantly from the Huthis’ defensive guerrilla warfare. The second phase 
started during the Arab Spring, when AQAP formed Ansar al-Shariah (ASY) and started 
an insurgency to capture towns in southern Yemen. Since the main focus of this study is 
insurgency, this section is about the second phase.  
The second phase of development saw AQAP shift from being exclusively a 
clandestine organization conducting terrorist operations, to an insurgent group interested 
in capturing and administrating territory. This began in late 2010, just before the Arab 
Spring, but picked up the pace in the wake of the protests. While AQAP and ASY have 
effectively fought the military and captured towns in southern Yemen, success has been 
fleeting. Independent-minded tribes do not want to live under what a ASY leader 
proclaimed as the “Taliban way” version of Shariah law.417  
The full insurgency started when al Qaeda militants seized a town in southern 
Yemen. Under the banner of AQAP, the town of Lawder (see Figure 5) was infiltrated 
then captured on 19 August 2010. The implementation of the brutal form of shariah law 
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was reported by fleeing townspeople, but rule only lasted a few days. The Yemeni 
military expelled the militants on 25 August. The citizens of Lawder then formed a 
Popular Committee militia to defend the town.418 The next month, AQAP captured 
Hawta, but this time it refused to let 12,000 residents leave in order to use them use 
human shields to prevent Yemen artillery operations. Nonetheless, the military recaptured 
Hawta a few days later.419 
 
Figure 5.  Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula/Ansar al Shariah Insurgency  
2011–2012.420 
After the start of the Arab Spring in Yemen, beginning in February 2011, AQAP 
announced the formation of Ansar al-Shariah (ASY). ASY massed its forces, 1000 
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strong, and captured the southern towns of Jaar in March 2011, and Abyan provisional 
capital Zinjibar in May. Only the 25 Mechanized Brigade held out, under siege in its 
base, with supplies air dropped by the U.S. In January 2012, ASY captured the town of 
Rida and emptied the prison there before departing. In February, ASY launched a 
surprise attack killing 185, and capturing 70 soldiers outside Zinjibar. ASY attacked 
Lawder a second time, but the local Popular Committee and the Yemeni military held 
them off. AQAP/ASY military commander (and USS Cole conspirer) was shortly after 
killed in an air strike. President Hadi launched a major offensive in May 2012, with 
20,000 troops, thousands of Saudi-funded Popular Committee militiamen, and joint 
Yemen Air Force and Yemeni Naval operations. The operation was successful, and by 
June the Yemeni military had liberated Zinjibar, Jaar, Shaqra and Azzan. After ASY’s 
defeat AQAP reverted to terrorist tactics.421 AQAP kept a low profile for most of 2013, 
and many members “slipped back into normal society,” according to Andrew Michaels 
and Sakhr Ayyash.422 
During the first and second phase, AQAP continued the “war” against America 
announced by bin Laden in 1996.423 These attacks include the Christmas Day underwear 
bomber and the parcel bomb plot.424 In August 2013 dozens of American Embassies 
across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia were closed due to an AQAP plot.425  
The tactics used by AQAP/ASY in the second phase include standard guerilla and 
terrorist operations such as: ambushes; published “death lists” of government officials, 
the use of human shields against Yemeni military forces,426 infiltrating a town before 
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taking it over, suicide bombings, hit-and-run raids, assassinations of government and 
tribal officials, and murdering civilians.427 
2. Organization and Resources 
AQAP “is heretical, compartmentalized, and decentralized” according to 
reporting form the Council on Foreign Relations.428 The organization is led by emir429 
Nasir al-Wuhayshi former aide-de-camp of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.430 Since 
taking command Wuhayshi strived to emulate his mentor bin Laden and designed a 
robust organization that could withstand the deaths of leaders, unlike the previous al 
Qaeda in Yemen (AQY). Wuhayshi also tried (but failed) to overcome mistakes made by 
previous jihadists and minimize civilian causalities and only attack legitimate targets.431 
In addition to being the emir of AQAP, he was also appointed the general manager of al 
Qaeda Core (AQC) by Ayman al-Zawahiri. His responsibility as general manager is to 
coordinate the operations of al Qaeda affiliates.432 
Ansar al-Shariah, the “rebranded” AQAP, acts as AQAP’s insurgent wing and 
when in control of village or town establishes shariah courts, administrates social 
services, and repairs broken infrastructure. 433 Wuhayshi said that AQAP was “try[ing] to 
win [the populace] over through the conveniences of life...”434 The areas under ASY 
administration are part of the so-called “Islamic Emirate of Abyan.”435 ASY forces focus 
on local issues and the near enemy while AQAP still tries to attack the far enemy. 
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AQAP models its hierarchical structure on AQC. The emir leads the organization 
with a secretary and shura council under him. The heads of the various departments sit on 
the shura council. AQAP differs from AQC in that it features regional emirs with a 
similar hierarchical under them. Figure 6 depicts this structure.436  
 
Figure 6.  Theoretical al Qaeda Organizational Structure  
in the Arabian Peninsula.437 
AQAP receives funding from both Yemeni and external sources. In Yemen, 
AQAP raises funds for its operations through kidnapping ransoms, bank robberies, drug 
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profits, and fraudulent charities.438 AQAP allegedly controls some drug smuggling routes 
through al-Jawf to Saudi Arabia.439 The major external source of money comes from rich 
Saudi donors.440  
AQAP and ASY are heavily armed and possess military grade weapons and 
vehicles much like the Huthis. Ansar al-Shariah forces captured a number of tanks, 
artillery pieces, and armored vehicles during battles in Abyan. The group distributed a 
video featuring a “military parade” in Jaar.441 Small arms are readily available in Yemen 
and AQAP likely buys what it need on the weapons market. AQAP also manufactures 
sophisticated improvised explosive devices. 442 
3. Recruitment and Popular Support 
The main recruiting efforts for AQAP are the mosque, the tribe and social ties, 
and later the Internet (see Chapter II.C.3). This section will focus mainly on the 
recruitment and makeup of the fighters. Information on direct supporters and 
sympathizers (popular supporters) was not available. Due to the clandestine and violent 
nature of al Qaeda, there are probably fewer direct supporters and sympathizers than 
fighters/operatives. This differs from the Huthis which have always actively recruited 
non-fighters.  
At the time of the creation of AQAP, the State Department’s Bureau of 
Counterterrorism estimated that AQAP had several hundred members.443 As of 2014, the 
State Department estimated the strength had risen to 1000—far less than the number of 
Huthi fighters.444 The bulk of AQAP fighter comes from five sources. First are the 
leaders, made up of Yemenis that escaped prison and formed the new al Qaeda in South 
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Arabian Peninsula in 2006. They are generally experienced, having fought in other 
Jihadi-Salafist groups. Second group is made up of Saudi al Qaeda members that escaped 
the kingdom and merged with AQSAP to form AQAP. The third wave of recruits came 
from jihadists returning from the Iraq War. The fourth group comes from locally 
recruited Yemenis, most joining the ASY militia starting in 2011. They join because they 
are disillusioned with the government or their tribal leadership. They are also relatively 
well paid by AQAP. In Ansar al Shariah’s “Islamic Emirate of Abyan” an estimated  
70 percent of the fighters were Yemeni tribal in origin but from outside Abyan.445 Finally 
the last group loyal to al-Wuhayshi are other foreign fighters including a large 
detachment from the allied al Shabab, other Arabs, Pakistanis, and Afghanis.446 As of 
2010, the estimated breakdown of AQAP was 56 percent Yemeni, 37 percent Saudi, and 
7 percent other foreigners.447  
Another recruitment strategy of AQAP is to indoctrinate and radicalize 
“homegrown violent extremists” to attack in their countries of residence so AQAP does 
not have to spend resources on the difficult task of sending AQAP members to the west 
to carry out terrorist operations.448 Anwar al-Awlaki was the prime international recruiter 
for AQAP. He is linked to the underwear bomber and the Ft. Hood shooter. He was killed 
in September 2011.449 Inspiring attacks in foreign countries allows AQAP to extend is 
terrorist goals with little cost to group.  
Yemen Polling Center found limited numbers of Yemenis answered that AQAP 
or ASY provides security in their area. Only a small number of people in Marib said that 
AQAP/ASY was the primary source of security. Throughout Yemen the jihadists are 
viewed one of the main sources of insecurity.450  
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Popular support has been rather elusive for AQAP. First, AQAP/ASY’s conduct 
has limited popular support. The brutal form of shariah law enacted by ASY includes 
punishments listed by Terrill as “crucifixions, public beheadings, amputations, and 
floggings” only manage to alienate the organization from the general population.451 Nasir 
al-Wuhayshi’s policy of trying to minimize civilian causalities and only target legitimate 
targets in order to gain popular support was put to test after AQAP members stormed a 
military hospital killing 45 Yemenis and seven foreigners. AQAP released a video of 
fighters killing unarmed doctors and nurses. The outrage against the perceived massacre 
caused al Qaeda to release an apology and the group offered to pay blood money to the 
victims’ families. AQAP blamed the attack on a rouge cell.452 This incident either shows 
a lack of centralized control of AQAP elements or a poorly planned attack that backfired 
for the group. 
Popular support was a major concern for Usama bin Laden. Documents found 
during the raid on his compound in Pakistan showed that he was troubled that the al 
Qaeda brand had been harmed by the brutal actions of the al Qaeda affiliates. He was also 
upset that AQAP shifted focus to attacking the Yemeni government. Bin Laden was 
afraid that AQAP was repeating the same mistakes that al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) made. He 
did not think AQAP had enough popular support to take over territory. It is also clear 
from his notes that AQC has little control over AQAP.453 The extreme sectarian nature, 
brutal version of Shariah law implemented in the Islamic Emirate of Abyan, and violent 
nature of the group limits mass popular support in Yemen. 
4. International Support 
There are no credible reports of AQAP receiving official assistance from any 
country. The Yemeni government under President Saleh alleged that AQAP was a 
member of a quadripartite alliance with the Huthis, Iran, and Libya. No evidence was 
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provided and AQAP are at war with the Huthis454 making the claim doubtful. AQAP 
does have relationships with other terrorist organizations. The closest and relationship is 
with Somalia’s al Shabab. AQAP and al Shabab have an alliance and al Shabab openly 
declared it was reinforcing AQAP in southern Yemen. ROY security forces reportedly 
arrested 29 Somalis working with AQAP during a two month period in 2012. The 
Yemeni and Somali governments each estimate 300 al Shabab members are fighting in 
Yemen alongside AQAP.455 
5. Territorial Gains and Losses 
Al Qaeda’s ability to capture, control, and administrate territory has thus far been 
limited. Currently AQAP/ASY can better be described as working in “areas of influence” 
rather than areas on under its control. This differs significantly from the Huthis. At its 
height in early 2012 though ASY controlled parts of Abyan and Shabwa governorates. 
AQAP only administered the so-called Islamic Emirate of Abyan from March 2011 to 
June 2012.456 Lucas Winter judges that AQAP/ASY does not have the capacity to control 
territory yet and are probably content with building grassroots support at this time.457  
D. CONCLUSION 
In sum, there are some key differences between the Huthis and AQAP 
insurgencies that make the Huthi insurgency more effective than al Qaeda’s. First, while 
Jihadi-Salafism has a history in Yemen that dates back to the 1980s, the Believing 
Youth/Huthis have a longer continuous movement. Additionally, the Huthis’ 
development differed because the movement started as a peaceful social movement, 
evolved into to a resistance group, then into an insurgency over the course of two 
decades. AQAP in Yemen is known foremost for its violence and terrorism, only recently 
turning into an insurgent force. Second, the Huthis organizational structure favors their 
group over al Qaeda in Yemen. The “tribal confederation”-type structure brings allies 
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together with common interests allowing for a broad base of support. The recent addition 
of President Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) to the pro-Huthi camp is probably 
a marriage of convenience, but it highlights the pragmatic nature of the group. This 
pragmatism is also highlighted with the alliance with the Revolutionary Youth and Hirak. 
Ultimately, the sectarian nature of the Huthis will limit the Huthis’ growth and tribal 
allies might quit the alliance if the threat of Ali Muhsin is removed. AQAP on the other 
hand, is still organized in a classic “al Qaeda” hierarchical structure that follows normal 
insurgent theory. Al Qaeda often finds resistance to their rule by locals. This relates to 
point three, the Huthis rely mostly on locals to fight in their home areas while AQAP 
relies heavily on outsiders, either from foreign countries or other parts of Yemen to run 
and fight for the short-lived Islamic Emirate of Abyan. This gives the Huthis the 
advantage in knowledge of terrain and motivation to fight. This advantage disappears as 
the Huthis leave their traditional Zaydi base in the northern Yemen highlands. All these 
factors help explain the Huthis more successful territorial gains.  
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V. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR YEMEN 
COUNTERINSURGENCY/COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES 
“As President, I have made it a priority to strengthen our partnership with 
the Yemeni government—training and equipping their security forces, 
sharing intelligence, and working with them to strike al-Qaeda 
terrorists.”458 
—President Barack Obama, January 2010. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
International support for Yemen’s counterinsurgency efforts will be essential for 
ending Yemen’s insurgencies. In Five Front War Daniel Byman argues that “critical 
alliance partners” are vital for both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. Allies 
can “provide training for security services, money for reconstruction, expertise to rebuild 
an infrastructure, and help establish the rule of law.”459 International support is not 
without its drawbacks, as assistance from the U.S. or outside powers can undermine 
Yemen’s legitimacy and embolden opponents.460 This was demonstrated by the Huthis 
during the 2003 Iraq War protests.461 Instead of large numbers of foreign troops Byman 
suggests that the use of special operation forces (SOF) to train military, police, and 
intelligence services.462 
For this chapter, since my measure of “success” is the simple control of territory, I 
will consider actions by international supporters with this measure in mind. Did the 
supporters’ actions help Yemen regain control of territory, or at least deny territory from 
insurgents? There are four forms of aid related to international support for COIN/CT 
policies; monetary, political/diplomatic, intelligence sharing/covert activity and military 
support. Quantifying support is difficult. Money can of course be represented in raw 
numbers but it does not explain how it is used or if it used for the intended propose. 
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Political/diplomatic aid can be analyzed by important acts. For example, naming a group 
a terrorist organization in a third country will hinder the groups support activities in that 
country. Intelligence sharing and covert activity is impossible to measure by its very 
nature and reporting relies on leaks. Finally, military support, especially direct military 
action, is the easiest to measure for this report.  
The Republic of Yemen (ROY) receives assistance from the U.S. and various 
regional allies. The Huthi and al Qaeda conflicts in Yemen concern not only the Yemeni 
government but regional and world powers. The U.S., the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA), and to a lesser extent the state of Qatar and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
have assisted Yemen’s efforts to bring stability and peace to its territory. In the battle 
against al Qaeda, ROY, the U.S., KSA, and Jordan share a common enemy.463 Yemen 
tried to link the Huthi war with the “global war on terror” (GWOT) and pressured the 
U.S. and EU to list the Huthis as a terrorist group.464 Under former President Saleh, Clark 
claims that “the U.S. and all the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] were at pains to 
reiterate their support for Yemen’s integrity under Saleh’s rule, and overlooked his highly 
dubious presentation of both the al-Huthi and [Hirak] as additional fronts in the old ‘War 
on Terror’.”465 The United States does not consider the Huthis a terrorist organization 
which limits the type of support it provides (see Table 1). Saudi Arabia has designated 
the Huthis as a terrorist organization and fought a brief border skirmish against the group. 
The U.S. and KSA consider AQAP a terrorist organization (see Table 2).466 Qatar has 
acted as a neutral mediator in the Huthi wars.467  
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Table 1.   International Support for Yemen’s COIN/CT Policies. 
 
Table 2.   Designated Terrorist Organizations. 
 Yemen Saudi 
Arabia468 
U.S.469 UN470 EU471 
Huthis X X    
AQAP X X X X X 
 
B. SAUDI ARABIAN SUPPORT FOR YEMEN COIN/CT 
Saudi Arabia provides support for ROY’s COIN/CT policies with monetary, 
political/diplomatic, intelligence sharing/covert activity, and military support. Sharing a 
900-mile long border with Yemen, Saudi Arabia arguably has the strongest interest in 
stability in Yemen.472 Saudi Arabia has also recently developed a special relationship 
with Yemen after the 2000 Jeddah treaty demarcated their borders, and is Yemen’s 
largest provider in foreign aid.473 A sociocultural element linking the two countries are 
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tribes found in both countries that often view tribal loyalties above national loyalties.474 
Both AQAP and the Huthis have attacked the Saudi Arabia in the past and are viewed as 
direct threats to the kingdom’s government.475 Saudi Arabia responded with direct 
military action against both the Huthi rebels and AQAP.476 The monarchy views the 
Huthi movement in the context of KSA-Iranian or Sunni-Shia cold war. KSA fear Iran is 
creating a “Shia crescent” to encroach and threaten Sunni Gulf countries. The Huthis are 
feared to become an Iranian pawn to destabilize the gulf countries.477 The cross-border 
smuggling of contraband, including explosives and heavy weapons, is also a concern to 
the Saudi government.478 
While al Qaeda’s presence in Saudi was first noted in 2000 with low level attacks 
on western expats,479 the major turning point in Saudi “relations” with al Qaeda was the 
2003 assault on the al-Muhaya housing compound in Riyadh. A car bomb was detonated 
blocks from Prince Mohammed bin Naif’s palace killing 17 Arab Muslims including,  
5 children. The attack enraged Saudi society, and for the first time clerics began 
reproving al Qaeda and its tactics. Families turned in their own relatives belonging to al 
Qaeda, and AQAP-SA went on the run and was largely destroyed by Saudi CT forces in 
2006.480 
Saudi’s strong support of the Yemeni government against al Qaeda stems from 
AQAP’s origins with the merger of AQAP-SA and AQSAP and attacks on Saudi 
interests and officials.481 AQAP’s most spectacular attack in the kingdom was the 2009 
attempted assassination of Prince Mohammed bin Naif, KSA’s current Minster of the 
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Interior.482 In 2012, attempted assassinations of Saudi officials in Yemen failed. Saudi 
Arabia has provided military and intelligence support to Yemen to combat AQAP. KSA 
intelligence operatives have reportedly penetrated the organization.483 Jabir al Fayfi, an 
AQAP member warned Saudi intelligence of ongoing plots which helped avert the 2010 
cargo plane bomb plot.484 Despite the going unrest in Yemen and the outing of Fayfi as a 
source, covert Saudi operations against AQAP reportedly continue.485  
KSA’s direct military support during the Abyan Campaign against AQAP and 
Ansar al Shariah (ASY) proved to be the tipping point that allowed the ROY military and 
the Popular Committee militia allies to take back Abyan from the insurgents.486 During 
the battle, the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) airdropped supplies to the besieged 25 
Mechanized Infantry Brigade. From July to August 2011, RSAF launched numerous air 
raids to relief pressure on the unit.487 KSA also paid a significant portion of the 
operations costs of the cash-strapped ROY counter-offensive. The kingdom also funded 
the tribal-based Popular Committee militias.488 
Saudi Arabia has been actively involved in the Huthi conflict. Funding tribal 
proxies to fight the Huthis marked the kingdoms entrance into the Huthi conflict. The 
Saudis allegedly started funding tribal militias and the ROY military shortly after the 
outbreak of violence in 2004.489 Saudi intelligence operators paid tribal sheiks for their 
loyalty to the Yemen regime. The Saudi agents also made payments to anti-ROY tribes 
lest they lose influence; a policy dubbed “ryialpoltik.”490 An estimated 6000 out of 9000 
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tribal leaders throughout Yemen receive payments from Saudi agents.491 The Saudi’s 
supposedly spent $100 million in payments in the sixth round of fighting alone.492 The 
Huthis allege that kingdom also provides matériel to the Yemeni government evident by 
“made in KSA” stamps on unexploded ordinance littering Sadah the country-side.493  
The Sadah War came to Saudi Arabian soil in November 2009. KSA allowed 
ROY forces to transit through Saudi territory to flank Huthi militiamen. In retaliation, 
Huthi insurgents crossed into Saudi Arabia and killed several border guards then seized 
two border villages and two mountains. Saudi clerics declared defensive jihad and the 
Saudi military quickly deployed to border to expel the Huthis.494 The events that 
followed can be described more as an internationalized intrastate conflict than support for 
COIN/CT policy.495 The terrain along the border was mountainous on the Yemeni side 
with foothills and plains on the KSA side.496 Saudi tactics involved heavy artillery and 
air bombardment of Huthi positions to kill and weaken as many fighters as possible 
followed by dismounted infantry engagements.497 The RSAF crossed the border to bomb 
Huthi rear positions. The Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) blockaded Yemen’s Red Sea 
coast to prevent arms smuggling.498 One hundred thirty-three Saudi soldiers died and an 
unknown number were injured and captured. The Huthis retreated from the KSA in early 
2010. In February 2010, a positive development occurred in the Sadah War. Saudi 
mediators succeeded in negotiating a cease-fire between the ROY and Huthis, ending 
Saudi’s direct involvement and the sixth round of conflict. Qatar latter expanded on the 
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ceasefire.499 The military efforts of the KSA have been viewed as encouraging the Huthis 
into finally accepting a lasting cease fire with ROY.500  
Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi (the Saudi version of Salafism) proselytization in 
Yemen, including in the Zaydi heartland of Sadah, has been destabilizing and was a 
major factor in the Huthi rebellion.501 The Believing Youth may not have mobilized if 
Saudis were not trying to convert the Zaydi population.502 Zuhair al Harthi, a member of 
Saudi’s Shura Council publicly raised concerns that Salafists will extinguish the 
moderate (Sunni) Shafi’i school and destabilize Yemen.503 Salafists have reportedly 
taken over the control of mosques through arms since at least the early 1990s. Salafists 
have also tried to prevent Zaydis from celebrating the Shia holiday of Id al-Ghadir.504 
Whether it was the intention or not, Saudi’s proselytization activities have been 
destabilizing in Yemen.  
Saudi Arabia’s interests, which are arguably linked to a stable Yemen, have 
caused the KSA to militarily engage both AQAP, and aid Yemen with intelligence 
sharing and funding.505 Saudi’s military efforts helped end AQAP/ASY’s hold in Abyan 
and ended the fiercest fighting in the north.506 Saudi activities have also destabilized 
Yemen. Salafist proselytization activities were a factor in destabilizing the north and 
Saudi’s payments to tribes fund the war economy.507 Joost R. Hiltermann argues that the 
conflict will only be resolved by focusing diplomatically on ending the conflicts by 
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helping Yemen address the “social, political, and religious grievances” that drive the 
conflicts.508 Such efforts could undermine popular support for the Huthis and al Qaeda. 
C. U.S. SUPPORT FOR YEMEN COIN/CT 
The main U.S. foreign policy goal for Yemen is the elimination of transnational 
terrorist threats originating in Yemen.509 Under Presidents Bush and Obama the main 
U.S. CT strategy for Yemen is to strengthen the capacity of the ROY government to 
defeat al Qaeda.510 Another long term CT policy for the U.S. is the economic and 
political development in Yemen.511 So far the U.S. maintains a “no boots on ground” 
policy reiterated by President Obama and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.512 
President Obama created a threefold strategy, adding organizing international support for 
stabilization efforts, to Bush’s strategy.513 This includes working to bring about a 
peaceful reconciliation in the Huthi conflict. Diplomats have visited Sadah city and made 
public statements in support of peace.514  
Under President Saleh, the relationship with the U.S. was not always viewed by 
the U.S. as great, but has improved dramatically under Hadi.515 Under former President 
Saleh, some U.S. officials complained that cooperation is not always forthcoming from 
Yemeni officials. The U.S. officials cited “catch and release” sentences for terrorists, 
limited sharing of intelligence, and no extradition of suspects to the U.S. W. Andrew 
Terrill suggests that the regime’s hands are partially tied by the rampant anti-
Americanism and a legal system that does not allow extradition. Too much cooperation 
with the U.S. generates government protests, such as the aforementioned Huthi anti-war 
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protest.516 Some U.S. officials claimed that the 2006 prison break was an inside job since 
some Political Security Organization (PSO) employees are former members of the 
Islamic Jihad of Yemen (IJY).517 This contentious relationship changed after President 
Hadi’s election. According to former Coordinator for Counterterrorism for the U.S. State 
Department, Daniel Benjamin, “He [Hadi] is everything his predecessor wasn’t in terms 
of his determination, his understanding of the threat… [and] his determination to destroy 
Al Qaeda.”518 Since the transition in 2011 the U.S. has paid $600 million in aid to the 
regime.519 
The modern CT Yemeni relationship with the U.S. started shortly after 9/11520 
when then President Saleh meet with President George W. Bush. Saleh came out in 
support of U.S. GWOT policies, in return for economic and military aid and reduced 
pressure on certain issues such as democratization.521 Saleh also agreed to intelligence 
sharing, and purportedly allowed a small number of CIA agents to assist the ROY in 
identifying al Qaeda members hiding in Yemen, according to the Congressional Research 
Service.522 Shortly after an air strike killed AQY leader al-Harithi (see Chapter II). The 
air strike lead to a quick collapse of AQY.  The air strike caused anti-American protests 
were so fierce that the U.S. embassy in was forced to evacuate.523  
Shortly after the campaign against AQY started in Yemen, ROY started receiving 
funding and military matériel including HMMWVs and armored personnel carriers 
(APCs.) The U.S. also sent SOF trainers under Joint Combined Exchange Training 
(JCET) missions to train the Yemeni Republican Guard (RG), the Central Security 
Forces-Counterterrorism Unit (CSF-CTU) and the Yemeni Special Operation Forces 
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(YSOF). In addition, the U.S. sent Coast Guard trainers to help establish the Yemeni 
Coast Guard to thwart contraband smuggling.524  
The Christmas 2009 attempted “underwear” bombing of an airline refocused 
America’s attention to Yemen. After the attack, the U.S. pressured the Yemeni 
government to target AQAP and not the Huthis, which despite the rhetoric posed little 
threat to the U.S.525 Shortly afterward, the February 2010 KSA-ROY-Huthi ceasefire 
went into place, ending the fiercest round of fighting.526 The U.S. increased financial aid 
from about $65 million in 2009 to $200 million in 2011.527 The U.S. also helped equip 
CT assets including transport aircraft, four HU-1 (HUEY) helicopters and upgrades to 10 
M-17 (HIP) helicopters and additional HMMWVs.528 The U.S. openly admitted to 
sending additional intelligence assets to work with the ROY government.529  
After the transition from President Saleh to President Hadi, military action against 
AQAP increased significantly. The use of UAVs in Yemen is no longer secret, although 
the missions are. In April 2012, the White House publicly stated that the U.S. targets 
terrorists in Yemen.530 In Yemen President Hadi went so far as to publicly welcome U.S. 
assistance as part of ROY’s CT strategy.531 Despite this support from President Saleh and 
President Hadi, America  remains unpopular in Yemen. 532While acknowledging the 
deeply unpopular nature of America in Yemen, Terrill argues that air strikes, resupply 
airdrops, and U.S. military planners helped tip the balance back in favor of the ROY 
during the Abyan campaign against AQAP, an assertion echoed by AQAP themselves.533  
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The Huthis are perceived by the U.S. government as a threat to U.S. interests only 
because the group is destabilizing Yemen, distracting Yemen from the fight against al 
Qaeda, and are damaging the economic, political, and social fabric in Yemen.534 The 
Huthis also pose a policy dilemma because CT resources earmarked for the fight against 
AQAP were being used to fight the Huthis.535 While the U.S. GWOT was designed to 
combat al Qaeda, Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells suggest that the additional firepower and 
backing of a powerful ally caused Saleh to over play his hand with the Huthis. He sought 
to crush the movement instead of negotiating.536 Husayn al-Huthi used, and the Huthi 
movement continue to use, anti-American rhetoric to rally support for the Huthi cause. 
The Huthis leveraged this popular anti-Americanism into broad popular support.537  
The Huthis first confronted the U.S. during a March 2003 anti-Iraq War march when 
4,000 Huthi supporters marched toward the U.S. embassy chanting “Death to America!” 
The chaotic protests ended with clashes between protestors and Yemeni security forces 
leaving two dead and many injured.538  
The U.S. has successfully helped Yemen defeat AQY and drive AQAP/ASY from 
its areas of control in Abyan because of the support provided. In addition to direct 
military action, the U.S. support of ROY includes intelligence, SOF training, and 
equipment. The tailored program were judged to be a good fit because small, fast units 
are good for CT operations but are of limited use against insurgents such as the Huthis.539  
D. OTHER COUNTRIES—JORDAN AND QATAR  
Jordan is Yemen’s strongest non-GCC Arab supporter. Jordan provided special 
operation training to the YSOF. According to Ambassador Edmund J. Hull (ret.) the 
Jordanian Special Forces trained the YSOF on the outskirts of Sanaa in a variety of 
tactics. The training was provided to combat AQY, since the Huthi insurgency had yet to 
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manifest itself. After U.S. Special Forces took over training of the YSOF, the Jordanian 
Special Forces remained acting as translators.540 Jordan’s role in Yemen was confined to 
training. The Islamic Republic of Iran alleged that Jordan was co-belligerent in the war 
against the Huthis, a charge that Jordan denied.541  
After the Arab Spring, the Yemeni military was restructured with the joint 
assistance of Jordan and the U.S. Jordan provided the ROY government expertise, and 
recommended “best practices” of restructuring. Additionally, Jordan sent a military 
committee of security experts to advise the ROY’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of 
the Interior. Limited numbers of Yemeni personnel have trained at Jordan’s world class 
King Abdullah II-Special Operations Training Center (KA-SOTC). The KA-SOTC, 
which was designed with U.S. assistance, serves as a special operation forces training 
center for Jordan and other Arab nations. Classes are thought in Arabic which makes 
training easier than taking classes from English-speakers.542 
Qatar acted as neutral mediator in Huthi War and labored for peace in northern 
Yemen.543 Qatar began its role as mediator in the early summer of 2007. The nine point 
“Doha agreement” was signed on February 1, 2008. The agreement called for a cession of 
hostilities. The Huthis agreed to disarmament of medium and heavy weapons and 
respecting the constitution and Sanaa’s right to govern. ROY government agreed to 
political liberalization, reconstruction, and amnesty.544 Qatar promised $300–$500 
million in reconstruction aid. The Doha agreement, signed by both parties, never went in 
effect and fighting never stopped.545 While Qatar’s efforts may be noble, there are signs 
that they may be counterproductive. Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells find in their study that 
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the peace process raised expectations, then failed and relapsed into conflict. This proved 
to be disappointing to parties involved and ordinary Yemenis.546  
Qatar’s second chance for mediation came in August 2010, when building on the 
success of the February KSA-ROY-Huthi ceasefire Qatar negotiated an “explanatory 
index” to the original Doha agreement.547 The ceasefire proved more durable since 
confidence measures were undertaken. Yemen released a large number of Huthi 
prisoners.548  
E. CONCLUSIONS 
A survey of international support for Yemen’s COIN/CT efforts to include 
monetary, political/diplomatic, intelligence sharing/covert activity, and military support 
reveal a heavy focus on combating al Qaeda from all external parties except Qatar. This 
is not unexpected, since al Qaeda threatens regional and Western countries. Efforts 
against al Qaeda have led to uneven results. AQY was destroyed through the joint efforts 
of Yemen and its allies. AQAP has proven to be more resilient, “upgrading” from a 
terrorist group to an insurgent group, and challenging the government’s authority in 
Abyan after the near collapse of the government during the Arab Spring. This study has 
shown that Saudi and American support through financial aid, political pressure, 
intelligence sharing, and direct military support helped end the AQAP/ASY’s reign in 
southern Yemen—a feat ROY had been unable to accomplish on its own. The Sadah War 
in the north has proven to be more difficult for the ROY. The Yemenis receive far less 
support from the international community in combating the Huthi insurgents. The U.S. 
and Qatar have focused on trying to resolve the conflict peacefully except for the brief 
border war with Saudi Arabia after a cross border raid. Clearly those efforts have failed, 
since the Huthis later took control of parts of Northern Yemeni. The international support 
for Yemen’s counterinsurgency against the Huthis has not been successful in preventing 
the spread of Huthi rule in the north. 
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The international activity in Yemen also negatively affected Yemen’s 
counterinsurgency. First, the Saudi government’s Wahhabi proselytization in Yemen 
destabilized Sadah and was a major factor in the Huthi rebellion.549 Second, the funding 
of tribal proxies to fight the Huthis, starting shortly after the outbreak of violence in 
2004, likely lengthened and expanded the conflict.550 Additionally, Saudi’s payments to 
anti-government tribes solely for influence, undermines the Yemeni government and 
contributes to the war economy.551 Finally, in the case of the U.S., President Saleh may 
have over played his hand against the Huthis, thinking the American firepower designed 
to fight AQAP would help him crush the Zaydis.552 It appears that the Huthi conflict may 
have been prolonged due to international activity in Yemen. Instead of comprise and 
accommodation, Saleh choose confrontation.  
 
                                                 
549 Hull, High Value Target, 112–3; Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 89. 
550 Hiltermann, “Disorder on the Border.”  
551 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 182; International Crisis Group, “Saada Time 
Bomb,” 18.  
552 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 126. 
 105
VI. CONCLUSION 
Returning to the original question: Why have Yemen’s counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism (COIN/CT) polices been less effective against the Huthi movement 
compared to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)? This paper can now answer 
with confidence that the military’s poor counterinsurgency and counterterrorism policies, 
the international effort to combat AQAP, the Huthis’ ability to recruit and mobilize large 
numbers of followers, and the Huthi leadership’s pragmatic alliances gave the Huthis the 
advantage over AQAP and the Republican of Yemen. Those are not the only factors but 
they are the most important ones. In this final chapter, the variables will be reexamined 
with the evidence presented in the earlier chapters.  
A. RECRUITING AND MOBILIZING SUPPORTERS 
The first variable was the background and development of the Huthis and AQAP 
(see Chapter II). The comparison of the two movements, using social movement theory, 
revealed several key differences that may explain why the Huthis have achieved mass 
support in parts of northern Yemen and AQAP struggles to recruit and mobilize 
members.  
The origins and ideology of the groups are quite different. The Huthis originated 
as a local, youth Quran study group, the Believing Youth. The group was a reaction to 
Saudi Arabian proselytization and embraced northern Yemen’s “traditional” Zaydi past. 
The ideology is linked to Zaydi ethics of “justice,” and its stated goals are firmly linked 
to western liberal thought. AQAP on the other hand, originated in international jihadi 
groups and until recently, the Jihadi-Salafists have focused almost exclusively on 
attacking the far enemy. The Jihadi-Salafists want to: return to the traditions of the 
original Muslims (salaf); enforce a strict and brutal version or Shariah law; overthrow the 
Yemeni regime to establish a so-called Islamic State; kill other Muslims, including 
noncombatants, and establish an “Islamic State.” The Huthi Zaydi ideology attracts more 
followers than the Jihadi-Salafist ideology, although al Qaeda does have a small solid 
base of support in Yemen.  
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The Huthis have taken better advantage of political opportunities and threats as 
they arose. The Huthis created a large base of support before the start of the Sadah War, 
which many locals saw as self-defense. The BY graduated students for a decade prior to 
the anti-American and anti-government protests that resulted in a government crackdown. 
The government crackdown led to growth of the group. More success came during the 
Arab Spring, when the Huthis consolidated power in Sadah while establishing a vibrant 
political wing that established ties and supported the Revolutionary Youth and Hirak 
movement. Finally, the most successful reaction to a political opportunity came when 
Brig. General Ali Muhsin’s soldiers and armed supporters of the Islah clashed with 
protestors in 2014. Huthi fighters responded to the attack and defeated both parties after 
large numbers of security forces switched sides and fought with the Huthis. The Huthis 
then forced President Hadi to sign a power sharing agreement to make the Huthis part of 
the government. AQAP on the hand used the Arab Spring to change from a clandestine 
terrorist organization to an insurgent group that also engaged in terrorist tactics. The 
move was met eventually with force from the Yemeni government, local Popular 
Committee militias, and international forces including Saudi Arabia and the U.S. 
The assessment of the mobilizing structures of the two groups reveals similar 
structures. Both groups recruited and mobilized members through the mosque and study 
groups. The study groups allowed for indoctrination and the building of a community. 
The community for the Huthis was the northern Yemeni Zaydi community and for the 
Salafists the international Umma.553 The Huthis also mobilized supporters at holiday 
gatherings and the jihadists mobilized at the tribal and Yemeni government level. IJY 
recruited many fighters in the civil war but most quit after the war was over. AQAP’s 
southern campaign has recruited young men from across Yemen, but repulsed locals with 
its bloodthirstiness.  
Finally, there are notable differences in framing. The Huthis emphasized local 
grievances and prescribed local solutions, a consistent message. AQAP conversely fused 
                                                 
553 Umma—the Islamic collective. Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, xxv.  
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local grievances with the pan-Islamic frames, and relied heavily on jihad as the only 
solution. The mixing of local and pan-Islamic frames often creates a confusing message. 
B. EFFECTIVENESS OF YEMENI GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
The second variable was effectiveness of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 
policies of the Republic of Yemen (see Chapter III). The counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism polities fall within the military paradigm. This is due to both the weak 
legal frame work and the limited policing ability of the Yemeni state. The main strategy 
used by the Yemeni government is repression with limited decapitation operations and 
negotiations. The Yemeni military was not capable of using repression to end the two 
insurgencies. Several factors limit the repressive abilities of the military. First, the 
military is designed in a “coup-proofing” structure that limits the use of the best trained 
and best equipped units to Sanaa as a praetorian guard. Second, the military is still 
equipped and designed to fight a conventional war with little movement to adapt to the 
realities of counterinsurgency warfare. Third, the COIN strategy of block-and-bombard 
hurts the government’s popular support by inflicting high levels of civilian casualties 
while destroying property and infrastructure. Finally, the political elite’s power struggles 
undermined the military’s ability to effectively fight AQAP or the Huthis. The 
counterinsurgency campaigns were wagged slightly different. The government was more 
repressive with the Huthis and Zaydis in general. During the AQAP campaign the 
government made more of an effort to work with locals.  
The only bright side to the public support for counterinsurgency policies is the 
government’s use of Popular Committees against AQAP. This policy is limited because 
the locals are siding with the government because AQAP happens to be worse than the 
government. It is a clear sign of the weakness of the government, which with all its armor 
and planes must rely on lightly armed and untrained tribal militias to act as its infantry.  
C. EFFECTIVENESS OF HUTHI AND AL QAEDA INSURGENCIES 
The third variable examined was the effectiveness the Huthis’ and AQAP’s 
military strategies and tactics, organization and resources, and recruitment (see Chapter 
IV). After the blitzkrieg offense that captured most of northwest Yemen by October 2014 
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(and possibly more by the time this paper is published) it became very clear that the 
Huthi’s insurgency was more effective than al Qaeda’s insurgency. What made the 
Huthis a spectacular success compared to AQAP and Ansar al-Shariah?  
There are several key differences between the Huthi and AQAP insurgencies that 
make the Huthi insurgency more effective than al Qaeda’s. First, the Huthis developed 
over a longer period of time and differed significantly from AQAP. While al Qaeda’s 
Jihadi-Salafism ideology has a history that dates back to the 1980s in Yemen, the 
Believing Youth/Huthis have a longer continuous group. In addition, the nature of the 
Believing Youth/Huthis changed throughout time. The movement started as a peaceful 
social movement, evolved into to a resistance group, then into to an insurgency over the 
course of two decades. AQAP on the other hand, originated with violence and terrorism, 
only recently turning into an insurgent force. Second, the Huthi’s organizational structure 
gives it an advantage over al Qaeda. The “tribal confederation”-type structure brings 
allies together with common interests and allows for a broader base of support. The 
addition of President Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) to the pro-Huthi camp is 
probably a marriage of convenience, but highlights the pragmatic nature of the Huthi 
leadership. This pragmatism is also highlighted with other alliances including, tribes, the 
Revolutionary Youth, and the Hirak. In due course, the sectarian nature of the Huthis will 
limit the Huthis’ growth and allies might quit the alliance if the common threat is gone. 
AQAP organizational structure differs because it is modeled after classic “al Qaeda” 
hierarchical structure. Finally, the Huthis use locals to fight in their home areas, while 
AQAP typically brings in outsiders, either from foreign countries or other parts of Yemen 
to administrate captured areas and fight for the short-lived Islamic Emirate of Abyan. 
Because of this, AQAP fought resistance to their rule by locals. This membership 
structure also favored the Huthis because fighters had knowledge of local terrain and 
motivation to fight. As the Huthis conquer Yemen though, this advantage will disappear. 
All these factors help explain the Huthis’s more successful territorial gains.  
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D. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE YEMENI GOVERNMENT, THE 
HUTHIS AND AQAP 
The final variable for this paper examines the role of outside support for Huthi 
movement, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Yemeni government. This variable 
was the only one covered in two chapters for the sake of flow (see Chapter IV.A.4 and 
IV.B.4, and Chapter V). First, there is limited support from outside countries for either  
the Huthis or AQAP. The Huthis receive limited weapon shipments from Iran and  
AQAP has no international support. Second, the international support for Yemen’s 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts focus almost exclusively on AQAP. The 
only notable exceptions were the Saudi Arabian border offensive in 2009, and the Qatari 
mediation efforts, which in retrospect did little to stop the Huthis.  
The international activity in Yemen also negatively affected Yemen’s 
counterinsurgency. Saudi Arabia’s proselytization in Sadah destabilized Yemen, and was 
named as a major grievance of the Huthis. Payment to tribes to fight the Huthis once the 
conflict started probably expanded and lengthened the war by adding a tribal element. 
The Sadah wars had a tribal undertone and the post-Arab spring fighting was between 
Huthis and Salafist, and the latter for a time had Saudi backing. It is also possible that 
President Saleh thought that the U.S. provided “war of terror” equipment and training 
might give him the upper hand in the north, where he felt more threatened, causing him to 
fight instead of negotiate. 
E. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
With dwindling oil, and thus money, continuing to attempt to repress the 
legitimate concerns of the Yemeni people—including the Huthis, Hirak, and the 
Revolutionary Youth—is a losing prospect. Right now it appears no one faction is 
powerful enough to control all of Yemen. Yemeni government policy must change if it 
wants to remain in power. The Yemeni government needs to reorganize, retrain, and 
reequip the military to focus more on counterinsurgency, focus the fight on Ansar al-
Shariah and AQAP, and improve the counterinsurgency strategy. The government should 
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adopt a strategy of clear-hold-build, followed by intelligence-driven police actively.554 
The Yemeni government should also shift policy on groups with legitimate grievances 
like the Huthis, Hirak, and the Revolutionary Youth. Negotiating with these groups and 
finishing the National Dialog Conference (NDC) would be the first step. 
For actors in the international community, while the home country’s best interests 
should come first, greater consideration should be given to the overall situation in 
Yemen. After all, what good is a friendly partnership with Yemen if the government 
collapses? Outside countries should make a greater effort to offset unpopular activities in 
Yemen with actions that help raise the government of Yemen’s popular support such as 
infrastructure projects, healthcare, education, and good governance. Encouraging the 
completion of the NDC and encouraging the Huthis to lay down its arms and become a 
non-violent political party should also be top priorities. 
Finally, this study can inspire other future studies. First, a deep dive into why 
President Saleh chose repression over negotiation with the Huthis is needed. I still do not 
fully understand why the government conducted a full-scale offense instead of paying off 
the Huthi family. Tribes make a nuisance of themselves all the time in Yemen and the 
government normally just pays them off. Second, a better account of the Huthis takeover 
is needed. Much of the initial reporting is rumors or contradicts other reports. Lastly, the 
format of this report could be used to examine similar multiple “counterinsurgencies” in 
places like Iraq or Syria.  
                                                 
554 Marston and Malkasian “Introduction” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 14–5.  
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APPENDIX.  MAP 
 
Figure 7.  Conflict Zone Map555 
                                                 
555 “Yemen’s Conflict Zones,” Stratford: Global Intelligence Center, lasted modified July 30, 2014, http://www.stratfor.com/image/yemens-conflict-zones. 
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